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LEAVING THE INVISIBLE UNIVERSE:    
WHY ALL VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY 
RENDITION NEED A CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
Peter Johnston* 
INTRODUCTION 
It begins with the “twenty minute takeout,” as that is all it 
takes for the victim to be “transformed into a state of almost total 
immobility and sensory deprivation.”1 The victim, usually in a 
small room, is quickly blindfolded by four to six Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) agents who are “dressed in black like 
ninjas” with their faces concealed.2 The agents, elite and highly 
trained, operate pursuant to an established modus operandi and 
they do not speak to each other.3 The victim is brutally punched, 
shoved, or firmly gripped, and then his hands and feet are 
                                                           
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.S.B.A., The University of North 
Carolina, 2004. The author wishes to thank Professor Wendy Seltzer and the 
members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their advice and assistance. He 
also appreciates the work of investigative reporters who help inform their readers 
about extraordinary rendition. 
1 COUNCIL OF EUR., PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON LEGAL 
AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ALLEGED SECRET DETENTIONS AND UNLAWFUL 
INTER-STATE TRANSFERS OF DETAINEES INVOLVING COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
MEMBER STATES 22–23 (June 12, 2006), available at http://assembly.coe. 
int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060606_Ejdoc162006PartII-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT]. 
2 Id. at 23; see also Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a 
CIA Mistake; German Citizen Released After Months in ‘Rendition,’ WASH. 
POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment]. 
3 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
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shackled.4 All of the victim’s clothes are then methodically cut 
from his body and he is subject to a full body cavity search.5 Next, 
the victim is photographed totally or nearly naked, and a foreign 
object, perhaps a tranquilizer, is forcibly inserted into his anus.6 
Then, the victim is dressed in a diaper, has his ears muffled, and a 
cloth bag, without holes for breathing or detecting light, is placed 
over his head.7 He is forced into an airplane, where he is placed on 
a stretcher, shackled, strapped to a seat or mattress, or “laid down 
on the floor of the plane [bound] up in a very uncomfortable 
position that makes him hurt from moving.”8 The flight can take up 
to an entire day, and the destination is either a detention facility 
operated by a cooperative nation in Central Asia or the Middle 
East, or one of the CIA’s own covert prisons, called “black sites.”9 
If the victim is sent to a black site, he is taken to his cell and his 
clothes are cut up and torn off.10 He may be kept naked for several 
weeks, and all he is given is a bowl, a bucket to urinate into, and a 
blanket that is too small.11 The weather in the cell is controlled to 
produce temperature extremes: sometimes “freezing cold,” 
sometimes “so hot one would gasp for breath.”12 The victim never 
experiences natural light or natural darkness, and he is frequently 
blindfolded.13 He will likely experience the “four month isolation 
                                                           
4 Id. at 23. 
5 Id.; see also Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
6 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 23–24; see 
also Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
7 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 24; see also 
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
8 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. 
9 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
10 COUNCIL OF EUROPE., PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON LEGAL 
AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SECRET DETENTIONS AND ILLEGAL TRANSFERS 
OF DETAINEES INVOLVING COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES: SECOND 
REPORT 51 (June 7, 2007), available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/ 
2007/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 
2007 REPORT]. For more details of the conditions of a typical CIA detention 
cell, see id. at 51–53. 
11 Id. at 51–52. 
12 Id. at 52. 
13 Id. 
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regime:” for more than 120 days, he is granted absolutely no 
contact with human beings other than masked, silent guards.14 
Additionally, his cell is subject to constant surveillance by cameras, 
microphones, and guards.15 
There is likely a shackling ring in the wall of the cell, and the 
victim’s body will be shackled and forced into contorted shapes for 
“long, painful periods.”16 The victim will be unable to sleep due to 
relentless noises and disturbances, such as engine noise, loud rock 
and rap music, cackling laughter, and the screams of women and 
children.17 Other torture techniques he may experience include “the 
cold cell,” where the victim is forced to stand naked in a cell kept at 
about fifty degrees and is continuously doused with cold water, 
and being forced to stand upright with his wrists and ankles 
shackled for more than forty hours.18 
The victim may also be waterboarded, a technique the United 
States considered a war crime in the tribunals after Japan’s defeat 
in World War II.19 Waterboarding is a form of “slow motion 
drowning” which involves placing cloth over the victim’s face and 
then pouring water on the cloth, causing the victim to choke or 
become unconscious because his throat is slowly being filled with 
water.20 Often the prisoner is strapped onto a board during the 
                                                           
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 53. 
17 Id. 
18 Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques 
Described, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/ 
WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866. 
19 Walter Pincus, Waterboarding Historically Controversial, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 5, 2006, at A17; Eric Weiner, Waterboarding: A Tortured History, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 7, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=15886834. In 1947, the United States 
charged Yukio Asano, a Japanese officer, with war crimes because he allegedly 
waterboarded an American civilian. He was convicted and sentenced to fifteen 
years of hard labor. Id. 
20 Weiner, supra note 19. Another less common form of waterboarding 
involves pumping water directly into the stomach of the victim, creating intense 
pain and a feeling like the victim’s “organs are on fire.” Id. 
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process.21 The victim’s gag reflex inevitably kicks in and he 
experiences a “terrifying fear of drowning.”22 Waterboarding is an 
attractive technique to some because it causes great physical and 
mental suffering without leaving any marks on the victim.23 
The process described above is not a horror movie, conspiracy 
theory, or set of allegations. It is a real practice created and 
executed by the United States of America.24 It is called 
“extraordinary rendition,” and it has happened to hundreds of 
people.25 
For purposes of this Note, extraordinary rendition is defined as 
“the transfer of an individual, with the involvement of the United 
States or its agents, to a foreign state where there are substantial 
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.”26 Extraordinary rendition includes situations 
in which the victim is transferred to a foreign state but is still in the 
custody of United States agents. It is one type of extra-legal 
transfer employed by the United States in the so-called “War on 
Terror.”27 By contrast, “regular” rendition is a process in which an 
                                                           
21 See id.; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18. 
22 Ross & Esposito, supra note 18. 
23 Weiner, supra note 19. 
24 CIA Chief Backs Rendition Flights, BBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2007, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7070483.stm [hereinafter CIA 
Chief Backs Rendition Flights]; COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra 
note 10, at 3. 
25 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
26 The “substantial grounds” standard is the same standard employed in the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998:  
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or 
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in 
which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person 
is physically present in the United States. 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, Title XXII, § 2242. 
27 See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary 
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336–37 
(2007). Other types of extra-legal transfers include the repatriation of detainees 
held at Guantanamo Bay or the transfer of detainees captured in battlefields in 
Iraq or Afghanistan. Id. 
JOHNSTON FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/18/07 4:40 PM  
 LEAVING THE INVISIBLE UNIVERSE 361 
individual is transferred from one nation to another without the 
benefit of legal procedures like extradition, removal, or exclusion 
and without allegations of involvement in torture.28 However, the 
distinction between rendition and extraordinary rendition is 
“increasingly being blurred” and U.S. officials and media reports 
frequently fail to distinguish between them.29 
Although victims of extraordinary rendition currently have 
several possible causes of action to redress their wrongful capture, 
torture, and suffering, each cause is subject to serious, often fatal, 
limitations. For example, the United States has successfully 
invoked the state secrets defense30 and the separation of powers 
and political question doctrines31 in response to lawsuits from 
victims of extraordinary rendition. The extent of civil liability for 
American officials who participate in extraordinary renditions is 
unclear, leaving the Executive Branch free to operate without 
checks and balances and deprive individuals of their due process 
rights. This Note argues that a law specifically allowing victims of 
extraordinary rendition to sue the United States will compensate 
victims while also discouraging the Executive Branch from acting 
outside the purview of Congress and the Judiciary. The national 
security and due process issues surrounding the practice of 
extraordinary rendition are best addressed by three branches of 
government, not one.32 Such a law will allow the Executive Branch 
                                                           
28 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & CENTER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL 
AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS” 5 (New 
York: ABCNY & NYU School of Law, 2004), available at http://www.chrgj. 
org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf [hereinafter TORTURE BY PROXY]. 
29 Id. at 13. 
30 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied El-Masri v. 
United States, 128 S.Ct. 373, 2007 WL 1646914, *1 (2007) (dismissing El-
Masri’s lawsuit because the government invoked the state secrets defense). For a 
detailed explanation of this defense, see infra Part II.A. 
31 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing 
Arar’s extraordinary rendition claims on separation of powers and political 
question doctrine grounds). For explanation of these two doctrines, see infra 
notes 188–190, 197–205 and accompanying text. 
32 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’ Connor, J., 
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to enforce the law and protect the United States while empowering 
the Judicial Branch to ensure that the Executive adheres to the 
constitutional requirements of due process. 
High-ranking members of the Executive Branch, such as 
President Bush and CIA Director Michael Hayden, claim that the 
extraordinary rendition program is justified because it produces 
valuable intelligence for the fight against terrorism.33 However, 
other members of the Executive Branch and some scholars maintain 
that the program actually harms the fight against terrorism.34 They 
argue that the components of extraordinary rendition, such as 
secret arbitrary detention and torture, erode the moral high ground 
that the United States must maintain to defeat terrorism, thereby 
facilitating the recruitment of new terrorists.35 Furthermore, 
extraordinary rendition is not necessary because less coercive 
interrogation methods are equally or more effective at eliciting 
information.36 Finally, the premise of the government’s argument—
that the individual rights of freedom from arbitrary detention and 
torture should be subjugated to claimed national security 
interests—is false. The means of extraordinary rendition turn the 
United States into the very type of place the government is 
supposed to protect its people against. 
Part I of this Note explains the development and mechanics of 
extraordinary rendition and the extent to which the U.S. 
government admits to the practice. It demonstrates why the core 
human rights of freedom against arbitrary detention and torture, 
both of which are violated by extraordinary rendition, should not 
be subjected to a balancing test just because the Executive Branch 
asserts that these rights need to be sacrificed in the name of 
national security. Part I also shows why extraordinary rendition is 
                                                           
plurality) (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in 
times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when 
individual liberties are at stake.”). 
 33 See infra note 88 and accompanying text; CIA Chief Backs Rendition 
Flights, supra note 24. 
 34  Infra Part I.E. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Infra Part I.D. 
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not necessary to protect the United States, how, in some ways, it 
actually damages the security of the nation, and that it promotes 
disrespect for human rights around the world. Part I concludes by 
detailing the plight of two innocent men, Khaled El-Masri and 
Maher Arar, wrongfully subjected to extraordinary rendition. Part 
II describes the three main existing causes of action for victims of 
extraordinary rendition and the problems litigants face in pursuing 
these theories of liability. Part III explains the proposed law and its 
essential elements, arguing that Congress should create a specific 
cause of action for victims of extraordinary rendition. This cause of 
action will alleviate concerns that the Judiciary is violating the 
political question doctrine and the separation of powers doctrine 
because Congress will specifically authorize the lawsuit. Such a 
legal remedy will also allow the Executive to preserve state secrets 
but still allow victims of extraordinary rendition to recover 
damages. Finally, the law will address practical problems that 
victims of extraordinary rendition face in suing the United States, 
such as the difficulty of corroborating their claims with evidence. 
I.  EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION EXPLAINED 
A.  Evolution and Mechanics of Extraordinary Rendition 
The CIA created the extraordinary rendition program in 1995 in 
response to fears that Osama bin Laden was acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction.37 Though the Agency had located many 
suspected terrorists, it was reluctant to bring them into the United 
States.38 If prosecuted in the United States, suspects must be 
granted due process,39 and the CIA would have to reveal secrets 
about its intelligence methods and sources.40 The fear that foreign 
                                                           
37 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. 
38 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s 
‘Extraordinary Rendition’ Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, 
at 109. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. For example, normally mundane tasks like establishing the chain of 
custody of a computer become complicated when foreign governments are 
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governments would be uncooperative if called to testify in court, 
coupled with CIA views that other branches of the government 
interfered,41 led the CIA to send suspects to Egypt, a nation 
frequently cited by the State Department for torturing its 
prisoners.42 Many of these suspects, some of them allegedly senior 
al Qaeda members, were Egyptian, and the Americans wanted them 
arrested while the Egyptians wanted custody over them so they 
could be interrogated.43 These complimentary interests led the 
American and Egyptian intelligence agencies to develop a close 
partnership whereby the Americans “could give the Egyptian 
interrogators questions they wanted to put to the detainees in the 
morning . . . and get answers by the evening.”44 
While questionable, these early extraordinary renditions still 
had more safeguards than the programs used today: every rendered 
individual was convicted in absentia, and all renditions were 
approved by CIA legal counsel on the basis of a substantive 
dossier.45 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, however, the 
extraordinary rendition program changed drastically: “there was a 
‘before 9/11’ and there was an ‘after 9/11.’ After 9/11, the gloves 
came off.”46 For example, “[w]hat began as a program aimed at a 
small, discrete set of suspects—people against whom there were 
outstanding foreign arrest warrants—came to include a wide and ill-
defined population.”47 The initial safeguards were eliminated due to 
                                                           
involved, as these governments may not want to admit their secret cooperation 
in open court. Id. 
41 For example, one time the State Department would not let the CIA and 
FBI question one of Osama bin Laden’s cousins in the United States because he 
had a diplomatic passport protecting him from law enforcement. Id. 
42 Id. For example, see U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, EGYPT, COUNTRY REPORTS 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl 
/rls/hrrpt/2006/78851.htm. 
43 Mayer, supra note 38, at 109. 
44 Id. at 110. 
45 Id. This statement is according to Michael Scheuer, a former CIA 
counter-terrorism expert involved in establishing the practice of extraordinary 
rendition. 
46 Id. at 112. This quote is from Cofer Black, then-in-charge of counter-
terrorism at the CIA, to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. 
47 Id. at 107. 
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the intense pressure on the CIA after September 11 to prevent 
another potential attack.48 Today, many people subject to 
extraordinary rendition have not been charged with a crime.49 The 
focus of these renditions has changed as well: rather than further a 
criminal investigation or trial, rendition is increasingly used for the 
purpose of interrogation and is often employed in circumstances 
indicating a foreseeable possibility of torture,50 Because the CIA 
does not normally comment publicly about the process, the exact 
number of renditions, extraordinary or regular, is unknown.51 
Post-September 11 pressure bore especially hard on the 
Counterterrorist Center (“CTC”), an office of the CIA referred to 
by a counterterrorism official as “the Camelot of 
counterterrorism.”52 After September 11, 2001, the CTC received 
thousands of pieces of information about potential threats, and the 
staff was increased from 300 to almost 1,200 “nearly overnight.”53 
Former and current intelligence officials have said that the shock of 
the attack, coupled with a frenzied, heightened responsibility led 
the “process of vetting and evaluating information [to] suffer[] 
greatly.”54 As admitted by a former senior intelligence official, 
“Whatever quality control mechanisms were in play on September 
10th were eliminated on September 11th.”55 
Not only is the process of culling new information unchecked 
and admittedly pressurized, but the CTC is also criticized by 
others in the CIA for its operations techniques in rendering 
individuals.56 Instead of using agents to penetrate terrorist 
networks, as it did in the past, the CTC presently employs a 
“Hollywood” model of capturing and detaining suspects, relying on 
                                                           
48 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Danielle Knight, Outsourcing A Real Nasty Job: Shipping Terrorism 
Suspects Overseas for Some Tough Questioning May Make Sense. But Is It 
Legal? U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May 23, 2005, at 34. 
52 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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flashy paramilitary efforts.57 
Further adding to the Hollywood quality of its operations, 
some detainees are flown by private jets owned by a series of 
dummy American corporations.58 These jets are operated by real 
companies controlled by or connected to the CIA, can often fly to 
locations where American military aircraft cannot, and have 
permits to land at American military bases worldwide.59 Also, 
these planes sometimes allow the CIA to avoid reporting 
requirements imposed by foreign governments on flights operated 
by other foreign governments.60 The CIA does not own or operate 
its own planes because it wants to act in secret.61 However, the 
CIA’s cover was blown by plane-spotting hobbyists with 
powerful binoculars and cameras, activists, investigative 
journalists, and investigations by foreign nations such as Italy and 
Sweden and multi-national investigative bodies such as the 
                                                           
57 Id. See supra notes 1–9 for a description of this process, known as the 
“twenty minute takedown.” 
58 Scott Shane, Stephen Grey & Margot Williams, CIA Expanding Terror 
Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at A1; 
Dana Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret In Terror War, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 
2004, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret]. For all practical 
purposes, the CIA owns these planes, but puts them under the name of shell 
corporations with unremarkable names to keep their operations secret. See id. 
These corporations seemingly have no premise other than owning these planes, 
and the officers and directors of these companies “seem to be invented.” Id. One 
such shell company is Premier Executive Transport Services: its directors and 
officers “appear to exist only on paper.” Id. This company owns a Gulfstream V 
jet, tail number N379P, that has clearance to land at American military bases 
worldwide and has landed at known U.S. government refueling locations. Id. 
59 Shane, Grey & Williams, supra note 58. These operating companies 
owned by or with ties to the CIA include Aero Contractors, Pegasus 
Technologies, and Tepper Aviation. Id. Aero Contractors was founded in 1979 
by a famous CIA officer and chief pilot for Air America, the CIA’s air company 
during the Vietnam era. Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.; Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret, supra note 58. For more on the CIA’s 
use of private aircraft to facilitate extraordinary rendition, see AMNESTY INT’L, 
BELOW THE RADAR: SECRET FLIGHTS TO TORTURE AND ‘DISAPPEARANCE’ 22–
24, 27–30 (Apr. 5, 2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ 
AMR510512006ENGLISH/$File/AMR5105106.pdf. 
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.62 One reason 
why these investigations yielded so much information is that these 
people and groups often worked together and shared information.63 
Furthermore, the American Civil Liberties Union has filed a lawsuit 
against a company allegedly involved in extraordinary rendition 
flights, Jeppesen Dataplan, a subsidiary of Boeing, alleging that the 
company provided flight and logistical support services for more 
than seventy extraordinary renditions during a four year period.64 
However, not all detainees are flown by privately-owned 
aircraft: some are flown by military planes, including large cargo 
planes.65 When detainees finally arrive at the rendition location, 
they often vanish into an “invisible universe.”66 Rendered suspects 
are not provided a lawyer, and often their families are not informed 
                                                           
62 Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret, supra note 58; Shane, Grey & Williams, 
supra note 58; COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 15–
21. 
63 For example, the Parliamentary Assembly investigation pieced together 
information gained from plane-spotters, investigative journalists, certain 
websites, victims of extraordinary rendition, flight records and logs, and legal 
proceedings in Europe and the United States. COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 17–18. For more detailed findings of this 
investigation, see id. at 15–21. 
64 Henry Weinstein, ACLU suit alleged firm is profiting from torture; The 
Boeing subsidiary is accused of helping facilitate mistreatment of terrorism 
suspects, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at B1. The suit accuses the company of 
profiting from torture and providing flight and logistical support services to the 
CIA, such as “itinerary, route, weather, and fuel planning, as well as customs 
clearance assistance, ground transportation, food, hotels and security.” Id. 
65 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. 
66 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate is 
Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set 
Up After 9/11, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, CIA 
Holds Terror Suspects]. The “invisible” term refers to the fact that the locations 
of these internment centers and basic information about how they operate is 
withheld from the public and almost all members of Congress responsible for 
oversight of the CIA’s covert actions. Indeed, “virtually nothing is known 
about who is kept in the facilities, what interrogation methods are employed 
with them, or how decisions are made about whether they should be detained or 
for how long.” Id. The “universe” term refers to the fact that this internment 
network is global and thus detainees could be in almost any part of the world. 
See id. 
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of their location.67 
The extent of CIA participation in the interrogation of rendered 
detainees varies from case to case.68 In some instances, U.S. 
officials observe live interrogations through one-way mirrors.69 In 
others, Americans feed questions to the interrogators,70 or question 
the detainees directly.71 Sometimes, the CIA employs a “false flag” 
technique by using fake disguises and décor meant to trick a 
detainee into thinking he is in a nation with a reputation for brutal 
interrogation although he is actually still under CIA control.72 In 
some cases, the CIA uses female interrogators to create a 
“psychologically jarring experience,” as many detainees were raised 
in conservative Muslim cultures where women are never in 
control.73 
Not only are suspected terrorists subjected to detention and 
abuse, but their family members—including children—are 
sometimes detained and subjected to coercive treatment as well.74 
Some of these family members have been subsequently released 
from custody, but others remain unaccounted for.75 Yusuf al-
Khalid, then nine years old, and Abed al-Khalid, then seven years 
old, were taken into custody by Pakistani intelligence officers in 
September 2002 when their apartment was raided.76 Their father is 
                                                           
67 Mayer, supra note 38, at 107. 
68 Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends 
Interrogations; ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects eld in 
Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A01. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects; Europe 
Aware of Operations, She Implies, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at A01. 
72 Priest & Gellman, supra note 68. 
73 Id. 
74 AMNESTY INT’L ET AL., OFF THE RECORD: U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 24–26 (2007), 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR510932007ENGLISH/ 
$File/AMR5109307.pdf [hereinafter OFF THE RECORD]. 
75 Id. at 24. 
76 Id.; Olga Craig, CIA holds young sons of captured al-Qa’eda chief, 
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 9, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co 
.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2003%2F03%2F09%2Fwalqa09.xml. 
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Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, accused of being the mastermind of the 
September 11 attacks, who is presently being held at Guantanamo 
Bay.77 In March 2003, Yusuf and Abed were transferred into CIA 
custody at a “secret address” in the United States so the CIA could 
question them and use them to get their father “to talk.”78 
B.  Extent to Which the Government Admits to Practicing 
Extraordinary Rendition 
On the record, the United States government admits to the 
practice of “regular” rendition, but states that it is not U.S. policy 
to send detainees “to countries where [it believes or it knows] that 
they’re going to be tortured.”79 In reality, however, this “policy” 
against international torture is rather flimsy. Former-U.S. Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales has claimed that if a detainee were 
transferred to a country with a history of torture, the United States 
will seek “additional assurances” that the transferred detainee will 
not be tortured.80 He nonetheless recognized, however, that the 
Bush Administration “can’t fully control” what other nations do, 
and did not know if nations had complied with any promises not to 
torture detainees.81 
Off the record, however, government officials admit to 
practicing extraordinary rendition involving as much torture as 
necessary.82 This practice is illustrated by a December 2002 
interview by The Washington Post with ten current national 
security officials and several former intelligence officials about 
detention and interrogation of captives.83 “The picture that emerges 
is of a brass-knuckled quest for information, often in concert with 
                                                           
77 Id. 
78 OFF THE RECORD, supra note 74, at 25; Craig, supra note 76. The fate of 
these children is unknown to the author of this Note. 
79 R. Jeffrey Smith, Gonzales Defends Transfer of Detainees, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A03. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Priest & Gellman, supra note 68; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18; 
Pincus, supra note 19. 
83 Priest & Gellman, supra note 68. 
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allies of dubious human rights reputation, in which the traditional 
lines between right and wrong, legal and inhumane, are evolving and 
blurred.”84 One of the officials interviewed, who supervised the 
capture and transfer of accused terrorists, told the paper, “If you 
don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you 
probably aren’t doing your job.”85 Another official directly 
involved in rendering captives said, “We don’t kick the shit out of 
them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the shit 
out of them.”86 Similarly, a third official, also directly involved in 
rendition, told The Washington Post that he knew detainees were 
likely to be tortured, and that he “do[es] it with [his] eyes open.”87 
C.  The Core Human Rights of Freedom Against Arbitrary 
Detention and Torture Should Not be Subverted in the 
Claimed Interest of National Security 
President Bush has stated that a “small number of suspected 
terrorist leaders and operatives” have been “held and questioned 
outside the United States in a separate program operated by the 
Central Intelligence Agency,” and that this program is “crucial to 
getting life-saving information” that will prevent future attacks.88 
Similarly, CIA Director Hayden has stated that the sole reason the 
United States has the rendition program is that it produces 
“irreplaceable intelligence.”89 Additionally, President Bush has 
stated that “Today’s war on terror is, above all, a struggle for 
freedom and liberty . . . . We’re fighting for our way of life and our 
ability to live in freedom. We’re fighting for the cause of humanity 
against those who seek to impose the darkness of tyranny and 
terror upon the entire world.”90 
                                                           
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. His eyes are open to the fact that detainees will probably be tortured 
after they are rendered. Id. 
88 Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1568, 
1570–74 (Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Remarks on the War on Terror]. 
89 CIA Chief Backs Rendition Flights, supra note 24. 
90 Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 88, at 1575. 
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It is hypocritical, in the name of “a struggle for freedom and 
liberty,” to in fact deny those same freedoms and liberties to 
victims of extraordinary rendition.91 Extraordinary rendition defeats 
the very freedoms it is designed to protect by itself spreading the 
“darkness of tyranny,” as arbitrary detention and torture are two 
of the primary tools of tyrants.92 Indeed, in a recent Supreme 
Court case in which the Executive Branch unilaterally detained an 
individual on the grounds that he was an “enemy combatant” who 
conspired with terrorists, four Justices cautioned that such 
detention “ha[s] created a unique and unprecedented threat to the 
freedom of every American citizen:”93 
[A]t stake in this case is nothing less than the very essence 
of a free society . . . . Unconstrained executive detention for 
the purpose of investigating and preventing subversive 
activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber . . . executive 
detention of subversive citizens . . . may not . . . be justified 
by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to 
extract information. Incommunicado detention for months 
on end is such a procedure . . . . For if this Nation is to 
remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not 
                                                           
91 See infra note 137 and accompanying text describing how extraordinary 
rendition is a hybrid human rights violation. 
92 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (Alexander Hamilton), available at 
http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/federalist/federalist-80-85/federalist.84.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2007) (“[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonment[] ha[s] 
been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrument[] of tyranny.”); see 
also United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1541 (10th Cir. 1989) (“We are 
mindful of the oft-quoted words of Judge Learned Hand that ‘[s]ave for torture, it 
would be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of 
unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination.’”). 
93 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (5–4 decision) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). In Padilla, Padilla was detained by the Department of Defense 
because the President determined that he was an “enemy combatant” who 
conspired with al Qaeda to execute terrorist attacks in the United States. Id. at 
430. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention, but 
the Court did not address the merits of Padilla’s claim because it ruled that as a 
threshold matter, he filed the petition with the wrong district court. Id. 
However, the dissent did address the merits and ruled that Padilla was entitled 
to a habeas proceeding. Id. at 464. 
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wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the 
forces of tyranny.94 
This passage warns against the dangers of extraordinary rendition 
as well because many victims of extraordinary rendition are also 
deemed enemy combatants,95 and victims of extraordinary rendition 
experience the same deprivation of liberty as enemy combatants: 
namely, incommunicado detention at the unrestrained will of the 
Executive Branch.96 
D.  Extraordinary Rendition is Not Necessary to Protect the 
Security of the United States 
From a practical perspective, the United States should not 
practice extraordinary rendition because other, non-or less coercive 
means of interrogation are equally or more effective at eliciting 
information from suspects.97 Indeed, experts on interrogation state 
that other interrogation methods—such as those employing 
carefully planned psychological techniques—are equally or more 
                                                           
94 Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
95 Mayer, supra note 38, at 107. 
96 See infra note 137 and accompanying text describing how extraordinary 
rendition is a hybrid human rights violation. 
97 Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement 
of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A1 (“Many veteran 
interrogators, psychologists, and other experts say that less coercive methods are 
equally or more effective” than “slaps to the head[,] long hours held naked in a 
frigid cell[,] days and nights without sleep while battered by thundering rock 
music[,] long periods manacled in stress positions[,] or the ultimate, 
waterboarding.”); see also Ross & Esposito, supra note 18 (“Two experienced 
officers have told ABC that there is little to be gained by these [coercive CIA 
techniques] that could not be more effectively gained by a methodical, careful, 
psychologically based interrogation.”); see also Larry Johnson, Editorial, Why 
Torture Should Never be an Option, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at 11. Mr. 
Johnson is a former CIA officer who was the deputy director of the State 
Department Office of Counterterrorism from 1989 to 1993. Id. Additionally, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Stimson told The Washington 
Post that interrogators “tell you that the intelligence they get from detainees is 
best derived through a period of rapport-building, long-term.” R. Jeffrey Smith 
& Michael Fletcher, Bush Says Detainees Will be Tried; He Confirms Existence 
of CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1. 
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effective at eliciting information.98 “What real CIA field officers 
know firsthand is that it is better to build a relationship of trust—
even with a terrorist, even if it’s time consuming—than to extract 
quick confessions through tactics such as those used by the Nazis 
and the Soviets, who believed that national security always 
trumped human rights.”99 More generally, the idea that the United 
States needs to subjugate the rights of some people for the alleged 
security of all people has been emphatically rejected by history.100 
                                                           
98 Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 97; Ross & Esposito, supra note 
18; Johnson, supra note 97; Smith & Fletcher, supra note 97.  
99 Johnson, supra note 97. 
100 GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 12–13 
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2004), identifies six crisis periods in American history 
when the government has significantly restricted civil liberties. These periods 
are: (a) the end of the Eighteenth Century, when the Sedition Act of 1798 was 
enacted, (b) the Civil War, (c) World War I, (d) World War II, (e) the Cold 
War, and (f) the Vietnam War. Professor Stone argues that the United States 
probably could have survived each of these crises without those infringements on 
civil liberties and that these infringements are regarded as mistakes. Id. at 528–
29.  
The Sedition Act of 1798 has been condemned in the “court of 
history,” Lincoln’s suspensions of habeas corpus were declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan, the 
Court’s own decisions upholding the World War I prosecutions of 
dissenters were all later effectively overruled, and the internment of 
Japanese-Americans during World War II has been the subject of 
repeated government apologies and reparations. Likewise, the Court’s 
decision in Dennis upholding the convictions of the leaders of the 
Communist Party has been discredited, the loyalty programs and 
legislative investigations of that era have all been condemned, and the 
efforts of the U.S. government to “expose, disrupt and otherwise 
neutralize” antiwar activities during the Vietnam War have been 
denounced by Congress and the Department of Justice. 
Id. at 529. He continues arguing that history has proven that in the face of 
danger, American citizens are willing to disadvantage “others,” such as Japanese 
Americans, Communists, and hippies, in the false belief that doing so will 
secure the safety of Americans. Id. at 529. Today, the “others” are suspected 
terrorists. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 50.  
The [Bush] Administration routinely speaks of “aliens,” “deadly 
enemies” and “faceless terrorists,” with the clear intention of 
dehumanizing its detainees in the eyes of the American population…. 
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Indeed, “[a]ll of history shows that arbitrary decisions, contempt 
for human values and torture have never been effective, have failed 
to resolve anything and, ultimately, have led only to a subsequent 
exacerbation of violence and brutality.”101 
Not only are other interrogation methods equally or more 
effective at eliciting information, but most experts agree that 
information gleaned from torture is unreliable.102 “You can get 
                                                           
By characterizing these people held in secret detention as ‘different’ 
from us—not as humans, but as ghosts, aliens, or terrorists—the US 
Government tries to lead us into the trap of thinking they are not like 
us, they are not subjects of the law, therefore their human rights do not 
deserve protection. 
Id. 
101 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 58. 
102 See Mayer, supra note 38, at 116; see also Scott Shane & Mark 
Mazzetti, Advisers Fault Harsh Methods In Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, May 
30, 2007, at A1 (Experts advising the Bush Administration on interrogation 
rules state that harsh interrogation techniques used since the 2001 terrorist 
attacks are “outmoded, amateurish, and unreliable.”); Ross & Esposito, supra 
note 18 (Many experienced intelligence agency and military interrogators feel 
that a confession induced by the CIA’s harsh interrogation techniques, such as 
waterboarding, is unreliable.); COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF 
CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS 
RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 193 (Ottawa, 
Public Works and Governments Services Canada, 2006), available at http:// 
www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf [hereinafter ARAR COMMISSION 
ANALYSIS] (After hearing from expert witnesses, the commission concluded that 
“[g]iving credence to statements obtained through torture can be dangerous, as 
the reliability of such statements is at best uncertain.”). For more on the Arar 
Commission, see infra note 158). Lt. Gen. John F. Kimmons, the Army 
deputy chief of staff for intelligence, has stated that “no good intelligence is 
going to come from abusive practices. I think the empirical evidence of the last 
five years, hard years, tell us that.” Smith & Fletcher, supra note 97. Paul 
Eaton, formerly Major General in the U.S. Army, stated that “the only thing 
you are sure of with torture is that pain is involved—the information you get 
may waste your time or worse.” Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial 
Detention, and Treatment Of Detainees: Restoring our Moral Credibility and 
Strengthening our Diplomatic Standing, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Paul Eaton, former Major 
General in the US Army), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/ 
testimony/2007/EatonTestimony070726.pdf. 
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anyone to confess to anything if the torture’s bad enough.”103 Even 
Porter Goss, the former Director of the CIA, acknowledges that 
“torture is counterproductive.”104 A large part of the problem is 
that many detainees simply “have nothing to tell.”105 
Compounding the problem of unreliability is the fact that false 
information regarding terrorism is “especially dangerous,” as it can 
have “grossly unfair” consequences, such as extraordinary 
rendition, for innocent individuals like Maher Arar.106 Therefore, 
any benefits flowing from information elicited by torture are offset 
to a certain degree by the harms of such information, which could 
include the torture of an innocent man.107 
In fact, “one of the greatest intelligence failures in American 
history” occurred in part because the Bush Administration believed 
in the tortured confessions extracted by extraordinary rendition.108 
                                                           
103 Ross and Esposito, supra note 18. This statement is according to 
former CIA officer Bob Baer. 
104 William Branigin, CIA Director Defends Detention Policy, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/29/AR2005112900667.html. 
105 Mayer, supra note 38, at 116. 
106 ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 13–14, 59, 61–62. 
Although the false intelligence regarding Maher Arar that led to his extraordinary 
rendition was not extracted by torture, that he was extraordinarily rendered based 
on false information demonstrates that false information, extracted by torture or 
not, can cause innocent people to be tortured. See id. at 13–14 (reporting that 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police provided the United States with false 
information about Maher Arar, and it is “very likely” that American authorities 
relied on this information in extraordinarily rendering Arar). It is possible that 
some past or future extraordinary renditions were/may be based on false 
information gained by the torture of other past rendition victims. 
107 See supra note 106. 
108 Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial Detention, and Treatment of 
Detainees: Restoring our Moral Credibility and Strengthening our Diplomatic 
Standing, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch Washington 
Advocacy Director), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/ 
2007/MalinowskiTestimony070726.pdf; Stephen Grey, CIA Rendition: The 
Smoking Gun Cable, ABC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://blogs. 
abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/11/cia-rendition-t.html; S. Rep. No. 109-331, at 
79–82 (2006); Ross & Esposito, supra note 18. 
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Ibn al Sheikh al Libi, a victim of extraordinary rendition to Egypt, 
was tortured by both the CIA and Egyptian authorities.109 The 
CIA waterboarded al Libi and subjected him to the “cold cell” by 
forcing him to stand naked overnight in a cold cell and regularly 
dousing him with cold water.110 Then, the CIA extraordinarily 
rendered him to Egypt, where he was beaten and effectively buried 
alive for about seventeen hours.111 To prevent further torture by 
American and Egyptian hands, al Libi made a series of false claims 
to his American and Egyptian captors.112 He claimed to be a 
member of al-Qaeda and he provided false information “regarding 
al-Qa’ida’s sending representatives to Iraq to try to obtain 
[weapons of mass destruction] assistance.”113 In February 2003, 
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell used these claims at the 
United Nations to justify the war in Iraq.114 However, when talking 
to CIA “debriefers” in 2004, al Libi recanted his claims and told the 
CIA that he was tortured.115 The CIA believed that he was tortured 
and retracted the intelligence he provided in a cable sent to CIA 
headquarters in Langley, Virginia116 This example demonstrates 
that not only is evidence regarding terrorism extracted by torture 
sometimes false, but that it can have extremely dangerous 
consequences affecting individuals around the world. 
                                                           
109 Malinowski, supra note 108; Grey, supra note 108; Ross & Esposito, 
supra note 18. 
110 Ross & Esposito, supra note 18; Malinowski, supra note 108. 
111 Grey, supra note 108; S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82. 
112 Malinowski, supra note 108; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18; Grey, 
supra note 108, S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82. 
113 Malinowski, supra note 108; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18; Grey, 
supra note 108, S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82. 
114 Grey, supra note 108; Malinowski, supra note 108. 
115 Grey, supra note 108; S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82. 
116 Grey, supra note 108; S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 82; see 
also Ross & Esposito, supra note 18 (“[I]t was later established that al Libbi 
had no knowledge of such training or weapons and fabricated the statements 
because he was terrified of further harsh treatment.”). 
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E.  The Extraordinary Rendition Program Damages the 
Security of the United States 
The extraordinary rendition program damages the national 
security of the United States because it erodes the moral high 
ground between the United States and terrorists117 and because it 
fuels anti-American sentiment around the globe.118 The United 
States has traditionally been viewed as a role model for upholding 
the values of democracy, civil liberties, and human rights.119 
However, when the United States violates its own principles by 
secretly detaining and torturing prisoners, it erodes the moral 
dichotomy between the United States and terrorists.120 
Significantly, extraordinary rendition tarnishes the image of the 
United States in the minds of the Muslim mainstream,121 whom, 
according to the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, the 
United States should make “the most powerful weapon in the war 
on terror.”122 
                                                           
117 Infra notes 120–121. 
118 Infra note 123. 
119 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 65; 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Malinowski, 
supra note 108. 
120 Malinowski, supra note 108; COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 65. 
121 Malinowski, supra note 108; see also Extraordinary Rendition, 
Extraterritorial Detention, and Treatment of Detainees: Restoring our Moral 
Credibility and Strengthening our Diplomatic Standing, Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Dr. Daniel 
Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies of the Edmund A. 
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow, 
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution) (“More 
broadly, successful counterterrorism depends in part on convincing the world 
that there is no moral equivalency between the terrorists and the government 
they oppose. When the United States muddies these waters, this distinction 
begins to blur. This is particularly problematic for U.S. attempts to woo fence-
sitters in the Muslim world—the very hearts and minds that the United States 
most needs.”). 
122 Press Release, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Declassified 
Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global 
Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” 2 (Apr. 2006), available at 
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Similarly, the extraordinary rendition program fuels anti-
American sentiment all over the world, especially in Europe:123 
Undoubtedly and understandably, Europeans are not 
pleased about their citizens or legal residents disappearing 
off the streets of their cities or being shuttled against their 
will and without due process to detention centers in 
Afghanistan. One only needs to imagine how we would feel 
about something parallel happening here in the United 
States to understand the sense of outrage. What has surely 
exacerbated this anger has been the sense that torture is the 
inevitable concomitant to these movements.124 
The fight against terrorism is as much a moral and political struggle 
as it is militaristic, and maintaining the moral high ground is critical 
because winning the minds of the Muslim mainstream, and thus 
dividing terrorists from the audiences they seek to persuade, is 
essential to defeating terrorism.125 As the United States loses moral 
                                                           
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf 
[hereinafter National Intelligence Estimate]. These Muslims will be a weapon 
not in the literal sense, but by rejecting the use of violence by terrorists and 
therefore undermining their community support and dividing terrorists from the 
“audiences they seek to persuade.” Id. 
123 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 65; 
Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher Arar: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Daniel Benjamin, Director, Center on the United States and 
Europe, The Brookings Institution and former director for counterterrorism on 
the National Security Council staff under the Clinton Administration) 
(Extraordinary rendition is at the “core of anger” among our European allies and 
others, and allegations of torture have contributed to the “deep slide” of 
America’s image in opinion polls around the world.). 
124 Benjamin, supra note 123. 
125 In the words of former Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak and 
former CENTCOM Commander Joseph Hoar, “This war will be won or lost 
not on the battlefield but in the minds of potential supporters who have not yet 
thrown in their lot with the enemy.” Malinowski, supra note 108. General 
David Petraeus recently told his troops in Iraq: “This fight depends on securing 
the population, which must understand that we—not our enemies—occupy the 
moral high ground.” Id. According to the April 2006 National Intelligence 
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integrity in the minds of individuals around the globe, its national 
security is damaged because this loss of integrity facilitates the 
recruitment of new terrorists.126 According to the U.S. Army’s 
Counterinsurgency Manual, since the United States cannot capture 
or kill every terrorist, the United States must diminish the 
terrorists’ “recuperative power”—their ability to recruit new 
fighters—by increasing its legitimacy and decreasing the terrorists’ 
legitimacy.127 
However, when the United States violates its own principles 
with activities like extraordinary rendition that involve secret 
detentions and torture, it loses the moral high ground as well as the 
minds of the Muslim mainstream, helping to fuel terrorists’ 
“recuperative power.”128 Illegitimate actions by U.S. forces, such 
as excessive use of force, unlawful detention, and torture “quickly 
become known throughout the local populace and eventually 
around the world,” and these actions “undermine both long-and 
short-term [counterinsurgency] efforts.”129 Because it entails 
contempt for the rule of law and massive violations of human 
rights, extraordinary rendition  
plays right into the hands of the criminals who seek to 
                                                           
Estimate, the United States needs to “divide [terrorists] from the audiences they 
seek to persuade” and make the “Muslim mainstream . . . the most powerful 
weapon in the war on terror.” National Intelligence Estimate, supra note 122, at 
2.  
More broadly, successful counterterrorism depends in part on 
convincing the world that there is no moral equivalency between the 
terrorists and the government they oppose. When the United States 
muddies these waters, this distinction begins to blur. This is 
particularly problematic for U.S. attempts to woo fence-sitters in the 
Muslim world—the very hearts and minds that the United States most 
needs.  
Byman, supra note 121. 
126 See supra, note 125. 
127 Counterinsurgency, Field Manual No. 3–24, Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication No. 3-33.5, Dec. 2006, at 1–23, available  at http://usacac.army. 
mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf [hereinafter Counterinsurgency]. 
128 Id; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 
65. 
129 Counterinsurgency, supra note 127, at 1–24. 
JOHNSTON FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/18/07 4:40 PM  
380 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
destroy our societies through terror. Moreover, in the 
process we give these criminals a degree of legitimacy—that 
of fighting an unfair system—and also generate sympathy 
for their cause, which cannot but serve as an encouragement 
to them and their supporters.130  
As mentioned earlier, extraordinary rendition causes anti-American 
sentiment,131 which, according to the April 2006 National 
Intelligence Estimate, is one factor that “fuel[s] the spread of the 
jihadist movement.”132 Compounding the problem is the fact that, 
according to retired Major General Paul Eaton, the United States 
“undoubtedly lost allies in the fight for Iraq . . . because of our 
policies on extraordinary rendition, secret detention, and the use of 
torture.”133 
Thus, it is clear that “[t]he best and most effective way to 
promote security is to preserve human rights and the rule of law. 
Departure from long established, fundamental legal protections 
only promotes lawlessness and ultimately makes everyone less 
safe.”134 
F.  Extraordinary Rendition Diminishes Respect for Human 
Rights Around the World 
The United States is the “most influential country on the face 
of the earth” and is a “standard setter in everything it does, for 
better or for worse.”135 Additionally, the United States is supposed 
                                                           
130 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 5. 
131 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 65; 
Benjamin, supra note 123. 
132 National Intelligence Estimate, supra note 122, at 2. 
133 Eaton, supra note 102. 
134 Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact 
on Transatlantic Relations: J. Hearing before the Subcomm. on International 
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of 
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Amnesty 
International USA) [hereinafter Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. 
Counterterrorism Policy] . 
135 Malinowski, supra note 108; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. 
JOHNSTON FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/18/07 4:40 PM  
 LEAVING THE INVISIBLE UNIVERSE 381 
to be the world’s leading protector of human rights.136 
Extraordinary rendition itself is a “hybrid” human rights violation, 
as it encompasses multiple acts, including “elements of arbitrary 
arrest, enforced disappearance, forcible transfer, torture, denial of 
access to consular officials, and denial of impartial tribunals,” each 
of which independently constitutes a rights violation.137 
When the United States engages in and justifies practices like 
extraordinary rendition, “all bets are off,” and “the entire 
framework upon which we depend to protect human rights—from 
the Geneva Conventions and treaties against torture—begins to fall 
apart.”138  
Because the whole idea of promoting democracy and human 
rights is so associated with the United States, America’s fall 
from grace has emboldened authoritarian governments to 
challenge the idea as never before. As the United States 
loses its moral leadership, the vacuum is filled by forces 
profoundly hostile to the cause of human rights.139 
G.  Some Victims of Extraordinary Rendition Are Innocent and 
Have No Ties to Terrorism 
Some victims of extraordinary rendition have absolutely no ties 
to terrorist activity.140 The well-publicized cases of two such 
                                                           
136 Malinowski, supra note 108; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. 
137 David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A 
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 127 (2006); see also 
Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, supra note 134. 
138 Malinowski, supra note 108; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. 
139 Malinowski, supra note 108. Mr. Malinowski cites an example of a 
meeting between Human Rights Watch and the Prime Minister of Egypt 
concerning the torture of hundreds of prisoners by Egyptian security forces. The 
Prime Minister did not deny that the forces tortured prisoners; he simply stated 
that “we’re just doing what the United States does.” Id. 
140 Moreover, the secrecy surrounding extraordinary rendition, combined 
with the lack of judicial oversight, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine the exact number of victims of “erroneous rendition.” Even CIA 
officials disagree over the number: one told The Washington Post that there were 
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victims who have sued the United States, Khaled El-Masri141 and 
Maher Arar,142 illustrate this problem. Khaled El-Masri, a German 
citizen of Lebanese descent and father of five, was captured in 
Macedonia on New Years Eve 2003 while attempting to cross the 
border between Serbia and Macedonia.143 The Macedonian 
authorities informed the CIA that they had detained El-Masri, and 
the CIA extraordinarily rendered El-Masri to the “Salt Pit,” a CIA 
prison in Afghanistan, because it thought his passport was forged 
and because his name was similar to that of a September 11, 2001 
hijacker associate.144 He was subjected to the “twenty minute 
takeout”145 and then detained in a cold, filthy cell in a basement 
with no light and a dirty blanket for four months.146 
The first night, he was kicked and beaten and told that “[y]ou 
are here in a country where no one knows about you, in a country 
where there is no law. If you die, we will bury you and no one will 
know.”147 All of his requests to meet with a German government 
official were denied, and his conditions were so bad that he went on 
a hunger strike for thirty-seven days until he was force-fed by 
tubes inserted into his nose and mouth.148 He was finally released 
                                                           
about thirty-six such victims, but other officials believe the number is smaller. 
Furthermore, there is no tribunal or judge to review the evidence against 
individuals seized by the CIA: the CIA is responsible for policing itself. Priest, 
Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
141 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
142 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
143 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 
530, 532 (E.D.Va. 2006). 
144 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
145 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533. For 
a description of the “twenty minute takeout,” see supra notes 1–9. 
146 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
147 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
148 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 26; El-Masri, 
437 F. Supp. 2d at 533–34. 
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by being left on the side of an abandoned road in Albania.149 
Fortunately, El-Masri has been re-united with his wife and 
children, but his German and Arab friends shun him due to his 
negative publicity.150 Khaled El-Masri is an innocent man with no 
ties to terrorist activity,151 and a Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe report noted twice that El-Masri’s descriptions 
of his extraordinary rendition were credible.152 
A second innocent victim of extraordinary rendition is Maher 
Arar, a Canadian citizen who, in October 2002, was extraordinarily 
rendered from JFK Airport in New York City to Syria, where he 
was held in degrading conditions and tortured for almost a year.153 
Arar was repeatedly beaten with an electrical cable on his hands 
and upper body, and he was forced to hear the screams of other 
detainees and subjected to other psychological stressors.154 The 
pain was so bad that “you forget the milk that you have been fed 
from the breast of your mother.”155 On top of the physical 
brutality, he was kept in a cell only six feet long, three feet wide, 
and seven feet high that was damp and “very cold” in the winter 
and “stifling” in the summer.156 Over time, the beatings decreased, 
and the worst aspect of his detention became the “daily horror” of 
living in his cell, which he described as a “grave” and “slow 
death.”157  
After a two-and-a-half year inquiry, a Canadian judicial report 
concluded “categorically that there is no evidence” that Arar 
committed any offense or is a security threat.158 The report is 
                                                           
149El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 534. 
150 Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2. 
151 See, e.g., Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 32. 
152 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25, 31. 
153 Doug Struck, Canadian Was Falsely Accused, Panel Says, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 19, 2006, at A01. 
154 ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 55–56. 
155 Mayer, supra note 38, at 106. 
156 ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 56. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 59. According to the Arar Commission’s website, http://www. 
ararcommission.ca/eng/index.htm, “The Inquiry was established February 5, 
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unique as it is the first time that a commission in the Western 
world investigating an allegation of extraordinary rendition had 
access to all relevant government documents, allowing it to “[see] 
the practice of extraordinary rendition in full color.”159 The report, 
in large part, blamed Canadian officials for providing American 
officials with faulty intelligence about Arar.160 
H.  The Bush Administration’s Legal Defense of Extraordinary 
Rendition 
In defense of extraordinary rendition, the Bush Administration 
(“the Administration”) posits three main legal arguments.161 First, 
it argues that human rights treaties, or particular provisions therein, 
do not apply to extraterritorial transfers because these treaties only 
apply to territory within U.S. jurisdiction.162 The Administration 
                                                           
2004 under Part I of the Inquiries Act, [R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11], on the 
recommendation of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness to investigate and report on the actions of Canadian 
officials in relation to Maher Arar.” “A public inquiry in Canada is a strong 
instrument for investigation and accountability. It has full power to subpoena 
relevant documents and enjoys de facto independence from the executive and 
legislative branches of government.” Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher 
Arar: Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human 
Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Kent Roach, Professor of Law and 
Prichard and Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy at the University of 
Toronto) [hereinafter Rendition to Torture]. This inquiry conducted a 
“thorough” investigation of the actions of Canadian officials, examined the 
classified versions of thousands of documents, and heard in-camera testimony of 
eighty-three witneses. Id. 
159 Struck, supra note 153. This quote is from Paul Cavalluzzo, counsel for 
the commission. 
160 ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 13–14. 
161 For a detailed explanation and criticism of these arguments, see 
Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1350–1418. 
162 Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1350–51. For example, the American 
Convention on Human Rights applies to “all persons subject to [a State 
Party’s] jurisdiction.” Id. at 1352; American Convention on Human Rights art. 
1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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has adopted a territorial rule of jurisdiction, arguing that jurisdiction 
is limited to the geographical spaces inside the United States.163 
Second, the Administration argues that the liability of the United 
States is barred when “host” nations that participate in 
extraordinary rendition provide diplomatic assurances that they 
will not torture detainees.164 However, these assurances lack any 
degree of trustworthiness and systematically fail to prevent 
torture.165 Finally, the Administration defends extraordinary 
rendition as a type of wartime transfer in a new type of war that is 
free from any limitations mandated by humanitarian law or human 
rights treaties.166 This argument states that since the United States 
is in an international armed conflict with a non-state enemy (al 
Qaeda), humanitarian law and treaties like the Geneva Conventions 
do not apply because these laws only govern armed conflicts 
between nations or intrastate armed conflict.167 However, 
international legal scholars and advocates reject this approach.168 
                                                           
163 Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1351. Some scholars argue that instead 
of defining jurisdiction in terms of geography, the better approach is to define 
jurisdiction in terms of whether or not the United States has personal control 
over an individual. Id. at 1369, 1375, 1379. This “personal control” approach 
takes into account the object and purpose of human rights law and prevents the 
United States from “carving out a space where no human rights law applies.” 
See id. at 1378, 1351. For a more detailed explanation and criticism of this 
argument, see id. at 1351–79. 
164 Id. at 1379. 
165 See infra Part III.A.6. For additional reasons why diplomatic assurances 
should not shield the United States from liability, see Satterthwaite, supra note 
27, at 1379–94. 
166 Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1395. 
167 Id. at 1399. For more explanation and criticism of this argument, see id. 
at 1399–1418. 
168 Id. at 1404–18. For example, some argue that while the laws of war are 
not applicable to the “war on terror,” human rights law continues to apply. Id. 
at 1404. Other scholars maintain that the conflict between the United States and 
al Qaeda constitutes a non-international armed conflict to which the rules 
applicable to such conflicts apply. Id. A third argument agrees with the 
Administration’s argument that the United States is in a new type of war, but 
posits that international humanitarian law must be read in conjunction with 
other rules of international law to protect the basic rights of every human being. 
Id. 
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Additionally, other scholars defend the practice in similar 
ways.169 John Yoo, a professor at the University of California Law 
School, who was formerly the Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
in the Bush Administration,170 argues that the September 11 
attacks were an act of war perpetrated by al Qaeda, and, as a result, 
the United States is at war with al Qaeda.171 According to Yoo, 
historical precedent demonstrates that the Constitution grants the 
President exclusive control over individuals captured during 
military operations.172 Furthermore, Yoo maintains that treaties 
such as the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (“GPW”)173 and the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“CAT”)174 do not apply to al Qaeda or the Taliban.175 Because al 
Qaeda is not a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions, 
and as members of the Taliban fail to meet certain standards 
explained in Article 4 of the Convention, Professor Yoo argues that 
the GPW and the CAT do not protect either group.176 For example, 
these eligibility standards require that individuals wear uniforms, 
openly bear arms, and follow the laws of war.177 
Importantly, the above arguments in defense of extraordinary 
rendition do not directly state that the practice is legal; rather, they 
state that there is no law regulating the practice. Understandably, 
                                                           
169 See, e.g. A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular 
Rendition, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2006). 
170 Mayer, supra note 38, at 112. 
171 John Yoo, Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a 
New Legal Regime After September 11?: Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1183, 1193–98 (2004). 
172 Id. at 1204–23. Yoo gives examples from the Revolutionary War to the 
Gulf War. Id. 
173 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
174 Dec 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
175 Yoo, supra note 171, at 1223–32. 
176 Id. at 1226–27. 
177 Id. See also John Yoo, Commentary: Behind the ‘torture memos,’ Jan. 
4, 2005, available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/01/05 
_johnyoo.shtml (arguing that al Qaeda members do not follow the laws of war 
because they hide among peaceful populations and attack civilians). 
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these defensive arguments are heavily criticized and rebutted,178 
leaving open the possibility that if these arguments are indeed 
meritless, and extraordinary rendition is in fact illegal, then victims 
of the process still face great legal hurdles for recovery, 
demonstrating the need for reform.179 On the other hand, if the legal 
arguments in defense of extraordinary rendition do hold merit, and 
the program in fact exists in a legal vacuum, Congress must act to 
preserve the rule of law, due process, and separation of powers. 
II.  CURRENT OPTIONS AND THEIR PROBLEMS 
Though victims of extraordinary rendition currently have three 
main causes of action, each legal claim has serious limitations. One 
option is to bring a Bivens180 claim against the United States. A 
second option is to bring suit under the Torture Victim Protection 
Act,181 and a third option is to file suit pursuant to the Alien Tort 
Statute,182 alleging violations of international legal norms or treaties 
prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention and/or torture. 
A.  Bivens Claims 
Under the first option, victims of extraordinary rendition can 
bring a Bivens claim against the United States. Bivens establishes 
that “the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent 
have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court 
despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right.”183 The 
                                                           
178 See, e.g., Satterthwaite, supra note 27; TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 
28, at 30–100. 
179 See infra Part II (explaining the problems extraordinary rendition 
victims face in litigating their claims under existing law). 
180 As developed in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). 
181 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (enacted March 12, 1992) (codified 
as Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
182 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Alien Tort Statute is also known as the Alien 
Tort Claims Act. 
183 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). In Bivens, FBI agents 
entered Bivens’ apartment, searched it, and arrested him in front of his family for 
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purpose of Bivens is to deter federal officers from violating 
individuals’ constitutional rights, and Bivens suits can be brought 
only against individual federal officers rather than federal 
agencies.184 A Bivens suit cannot proceed if either the plaintiff 
already has an identifiable, statutory cause of action or if “special 
factors” warrant hesitation in creating a new cause of action when 
Congress has declined to explicitly do so.185 In subsequent cases, 
the Supreme Court has ruled that Bivens remedies are available for 
some, but not all, constitutional violations.186 
The Supreme Court, however, is hesitant about allowing Bivens 
claims if the separation of powers or political questions doctrine is 
involved.187 The separation of powers doctrine bars the judiciary 
from adjudicating matters solely within the purview of the 
executive or legislative branches, including the “conduct of foreign 
relations,” which is constitutionally reserved to the Executive.188 
Likewise, “[t]he political question doctrine excludes from judicial 
review those controversies which revolve around policy choices 
and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution 
                                                           
alleged narcotics violations. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Bivens brought suit, 
claiming that the arrest and search were conducted without a warrant, that the 
FBI employed unreasonable force in making the arrest, and that the arrest was 
made without probable cause. Id. Bivens claimed damages for humiliation, 
embarrassment, and mental suffering. Id. at 389–90. The Supreme Court 
eventually heard the case and ruled that the complaint stated a valid cause of 
action and that Bivens was entitled to money damages for any injuries he 
suffered as a result of the FBI agents’ violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 
397. 
184 See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68–70 (2001). 
185 Id. at 67. 
186 When the Bivens remedy was created, it only applied to violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 66. Since then, the Court has extended Bivens to 
cover some violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 
violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eight 
Amendment, but not a First Amendment violation arising in the context of 
federal employment. Id. at 67–68. For a more detailed explanation of the 
Court’s Bivens jurisprudence, see id. at 65–74. 
187 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
188 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952). 
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to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.”189 
The idea underlying this doctrine is that “courts are fundamentally 
underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards 
for matters not legal in nature.”190 
In Chappell v. Wallace,191 the Supreme Court “expressly 
cautioned . . . that [a Bivens] remedy will not be available when 
‘special factors counseling hesitation’ are present.”192 These factors 
are not at all related to the merits of the case, rather, they involve 
“the question of who should decide whether . . . a remedy should 
be provided.”193 Pursuant to this rationale, courts will not extend a 
Bivens remedy if the court believes the issue can be better decided 
by other branches of government.194 
Arar v. Ashcroft195 provides an example of the difficulties a 
plaintiff may face in bringing a Bivens claim with respect to the 
separation of powers and political question doctrines. The plaintiff 
in Arar sued a number of United States officials, including former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft and former Secretary of 
Homeland Security Tom Ridge, and asserted two Bivens claims, 
alleging he was a victim of extraordinary rendition.196 
                                                           
189 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986). 
190 Id. 
191 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
192 Id. at 298 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). 
193 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983). 
194 See id. at 378–80.  Indeed, the Arar court rejected Arar’s Bivens claim 
for that exact reason. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (“[G]iven the serious national-security and foreign policy issues at stake, 
Bivens did not extend a remedy to Arar for his deportation to Syria and any 
torture that occurred there.”). 
195 414 F. Supp. 2d at 280–83. 
196 Id. at 257–58, 266–67. Arar’s first Bivens claim was that defendants 
violated his substantive due process rights, protected by the Fifth Amendment, 
by “knowingly and intentionally subjecting him to torture and coercive 
interrogation in Syria.” Id. at 257. Arar’s second Bivens claim was that his 
substantive due process rights were violated by defendants when they subjected 
him to arbitrary and indefinite detention without “access to counsel, the courts, 
or his consulate.” Id. at 257–58, 266–67. Arar sought a declaratory judgment 
and compensatory and punitive damages for both of these counts. Id. at 258. 
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The Arar court dismissed Arar’s Bivens claims pursuant to the 
separation of powers and political question doctrines.197 In refusing 
to address the claims, the court noted that it must proceed 
cautiously in reviewing claims that involve foreign policy and 
relations with foreign governments, especially when such claims 
raise policy issues that “are the prerogative of coordinate branches 
of government.”198 Laying the groundwork for dismissal under the 
separation of powers and political question doctrines, the Court 
first wrote that the case did indeed raise national security and 
foreign policy considerations implicating multi-national agreements 
aimed at stopping terrorism, and that the propriety of these 
considerations was better reserved to the Executive and Legislative 
branches.199 Additionally, the Court felt that allowing Arar’s suit 
to proceed would make foreign governments who covertly 
cooperate with the United States think twice about future 
cooperation, given the possibility of exposure in court.200 The 
Court further sidestepped review by quoting a Supreme Court case 
noting the difficulties with assessing or dealing with alien claims: 
Any policy towards aliens is vitally and intricately 
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the 
conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the 
maintenance of a republican form of government. Such 
matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political 
branches of government as to be largely immune from 
judicial inquiry or interference.201 
 Finally, the court rejected Arar’s Bivens claims by relying on 
the “fundamental difference” between evaluating the actions of 
domestic federal officials and those of international federal 
                                                           
197 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
198 Id. at 281. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. This suggests that the United States needs to rely on secret 
agreements with other nations in order to “respond to situations involving our 
national interest” and that Arar’s suit would basically force the U.S. government 
to disclose information it told other nations it would keep secret, which would 
cause “embarrassment of our government abroad.” Id. (citations omitted). 
201 Id. at 282 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 
(1952)). 
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officials.202 Evaluating federal officials’ actions in the United States 
allows judges to balance individual rights vis-à-vis government 
interests by using their “experience derived from living in a free and 
democratic society.”203 The evaluation of foreign officials’ actions, 
however, is different, as the government interests involved may be 
drastically distinct from fundamental American values, leaving 
judges with no knowledge or experience in evaluating such 
actions.204 In short, the court determined that any judicial 
declaration that extraordinary rendition was unconstitutional would 
seriously impact foreign policy, a matter better left for other 
branches of government that could better balance the interests 
involved.205 
In addition to arguing that the separation of powers and 
political question doctrines bar adjudication of the case, the 
government can also raise the state secrets defense in response to a 
Bivens claim.206 This defense is a common law doctrine developed 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds207 and 
recognizes a privilege against revealing certain information that, if 
made part of the public record in a civil or criminal proceeding, 
would expose information detrimental to national security.208 This 
privilege belongs only to the government, must be asserted by the 
                                                           
202 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 283. 
206 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007). 
Khaled El-Masri, claiming to be a victim of extraordinary rendition, sued the 
Director of the CIA and other unknown agents pursuant to, inter alia, Bivens, 
alleging violations of his Fifth Amendment Due Process right. El-Masri v. 
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534 (E.D.Va. 2006). The United States intervened 
as a defendant and persuaded the court to dismiss El-Masri’s complaint on state 
secrets grounds, and the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal. El-Masri v. 
United States, 479 F.3d at 299–300. This privilege is a barrier to a Bivens 
claim by any extraordinary rendition victim because the privilege arises out of 
the extraordinary rendition program itself and the government’s contention that 
the program needs to be kept secret. See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 
538–39. 
207 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953). 
208 See id. at 1, 7–8, 10. 
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government, and “is not to be lightly invoked.”209 When formally 
created and articled by the Reynolds court, the privilege was a 
means of preventing discovery by the plaintiffs against the 
government,210 but has been extended by the Circuit Courts as a 
ground for dismissing the entire case when the state secrets are “so 
central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to 
proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matter.”211 
As previously mentioned, the case of Khaled El-Masri 
illustrates how easily the government can use the state secrets 
                                                           
209 Id. at 7. The Reynolds Court imposed several requirements for successful 
invocation of the privilege. The head of the department with control over the 
issue, after personal consideration of the matter, must make a formal claim of 
privilege. Id. at 7, 8. Next, “the court itself must determine whether the 
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege,” and do so without 
examining the evidence; even the judge cannot examine the evidence privately in 
chambers. Id. at 8, 10. Considering all the circumstances of the case, if the court 
concludes that there is a “reasonable danger” that production of the evidence 
would expose matters that should not be disclosed due to national security 
concerns, the privilege should prevent disclosure of those matters. Id. at 10. 
Finally, even “the most compelling necessity” cannot overcome an approved 
claim of privilege. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). 
 In Reynolds, three civilian observers riding in an Air Force B-29 aircraft 
died when the plane crashed, and their widows brought suits against the United 
States. Id. at 3. In pretrial discovery motions, the plaintiffs asked for production 
of the Air Force’s official accident investigation report as well as statements of 
the three surviving crew members that were taken in connection with the 
investigation. Id. at 4. The government’s argument, supported by an affidavit of 
the Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force, was that the 
requested report and statements would “seriously hamper national security” if 
furnished. Id. at 5, 6. The District Court ordered the government to produce the 
evidence so the court could decide if it in fact contained sensitive matters, but 
the government did not obey the order. Id. at 5. Therefore, the court ordered that 
the facts on the issue of negligence would be decided in plaintiff’s favor, and 
final judgment was entered for the plaintiffs after a damages hearing. Id. The 
government appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in full. United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 5 (1953). In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme 
Court officially created the state secrets privilege. See id. at 6–10. 
210 Id. at 3. 
211 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300, 306 (4th Cir. 
2007) (dismissing El-Masri’s suit on state secrets grounds and collecting cases 
where other Circuit Courts of Appeal dismissed cases on state secrets grounds). 
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doctrine to dismiss lawsuits alleging extraordinary rendition.212 On 
appeal, the plaintiff acknowledged that although some of the 
information important to his claims may be protected by the state 
secrets privilege, his case could be litigated without their 
disclosure.213 Moreover, the plaintiff argued that the facts central 
to his case are no longer secrets because they were made public by 
statements of United States officials or in reports by media 
organizations and foreign governments.214 According to the 
plaintiff, the fact that the CIA operates a rendition program 
targeted at terrorism suspects and the tactics employed therein are 
so widely discussed that litigation concerning them could not harm 
national security.215 
Although the Fourth Circuit agreed that the general subject 
matter of the litigation could be described without resort to state 
secrets, the court stated that the controlling inquiry was whether 
the action could be litigated without resort to state secrets.216 In 
order to establish a prima facie case, the Fourth Circuit maintained 
that the plaintiff would have to produce evidence that the 
defendants detained and interrogated him in a manner rendering 
them personally liable.217 “Such a showing could be made only 
with evidence that exposes how the CIA organizes, staffs, and 
supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations,” and gathering 
this evidence would require the plaintiff to rely on witnesses 
whose identities, and even very existence, must remain secret in the 
interest of national security.218 Furthermore, even if the plaintiff 
could create a prima facie case, the Court continued, the defendants 
                                                           
212 Id. at 299–300. 
213 Id. at 303. 
214 Id. at 308. That Khaled El-Masri was subject to extraordinary rendition 
and the details of his experience have been extensively reported by the media and 
government reports. See supra Part II.G (citations to media and government 
reports detailing the extraordinary rendition of El-Masri.) 
215 Id. Indeed, the abundance of reports cited within this Note shows that 
the extraordinary rendition program has received extensive media coverage. 
216 Id. at 309. 
217 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007). 
218 Id. 
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could not defend themselves without using privileged evidence.219 
The fourth problem facing any Bivens-based cause of action is 
evidentiary: it is usually difficult, if not impossible, for victims of 
extraordinary rendition to gather enough corroborative evidence to 
bring a lawsuit.220 Indeed, one of the reasons the CIA engages in 
extraordinary rendition is because doing so means it will not have 
to reveal sensitive information about its intelligence methods and 
sources in American courts.221 The whole process of extraordinary 
rendition is secret; victims have been described as entering an 
“invisible universe,”222 and detainees like Arar allege that they were 
held incommunicado and denied access to a lawyer, courts, or their 
consulate.223 Additionally, outside organizations that provide relief 
to such detainees are often denied access to rendered individuals.224 
For example, the United States has prevented the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) from meeting with some 
overseas detainees, despite its request to meet with all of them, for 
                                                           
219 Id.  
The main avenues of defense available in this matter are to show that 
El-Masri was not subject to the treatment that he alleges; that, if he was 
subject to such treatment, the defendants were not involved in it; or 
that, if they were involved, the nature of their involvement does not 
give rise to liability. Any of those three showings would require 
disclosure of information regarding the means and methods by which 
the CIA gathers intelligence. 
Id. 
220 See infra notes 221–25 and accompanying text discussing the secrecy 
surrounding the extraordinary rendition program. Maher Arar and Khalid El-
Masri are exceptions to this general problem because their cases have received 
extensive media attention, and Arar’s case is the subject of a detailed 
government investigation. 
221 Mayer, supra note 38, at 109. 
222 Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects, supra note 66. 
223 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257–58, 266–67 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006). Since detainees cannot see any humans other than their captors, there is 
no neutral third party who can evaluate the detainees’ claims of torture and 
collect evidence supporting or denying those claims. Id. 
224 Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Rebuffs Red Cross Request for Access to 
Detainees Held in Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A10; Red Cross 
Wants Access to Secret U.S. Jails, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2005, at 7; Priest & 
Gellman, supra note 68. 
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reasons of “national security.”225 All of these factors demonstrate 
that many victims of extraordinary rendition who have not been the 
subject of media attention or official investigations probably could 
not bring any action against the United States because the very 
nature of their detention prevented them from gathering any 
evidence to corroborate their allegations. 
B.   Torture Victim Protection Act 
A second cause of action for victims of extraordinary rendition 
is to bring a claim under the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(“TVPA”).226 Enacted in 1992, the TVPA reads: 
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an 
individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to 
extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any 
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful 
death.227 
                                                           
225 Supra note 224. Under international law, the ICRC has a special status 
as the guardian of international humanitarian law. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra 
note 28, at 2 n.2. According to the ICRC website,  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, 
neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian 
mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and 
internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and 
coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the 
Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent 
suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and 
universal humanitarian principles. 
International Committee of the Red Cross, The Mission, http://www.icrc.org/ 
HOME.NSF/060a34982cae624ec12566fe00326312/125ffe2d4c7f68acc1256ae300
394f6e?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 17, 2007). One of the Red Cross’ 
central purposes is to visit prisoners and protect their human rights. See 
Weisman, supra note 224. 
226 The TVPA is appended as a statutory note to the Alien Tort Claims 
Act; it is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
227 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 260. Under the TVPA, torture is defined as 
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Before one can bring a claim under the TVPA, however, all 
“adequate and available” local remedies must be exhausted,228 and 
the timing of the suit is particularly important because of a ten year 
statute of limitations.229 Although the text of the TVPA only 
grants a cause of action against direct, primary violators, every 
court that has considered the issue has held that the TVPA also 
allows claims against secondary violators who aid and abet, or 
conspire with, primary violators.230 
Despite such judicial interpretation, the TVPA is an ineffective 
remedy for victims of extraordinary rendition as it requires that 
defendant(s) act “under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
law, of any foreign nation.”231 For example, even though the CIA 
agents allegedly involved in Arar’s torture were “some of the 
highest policy-making officials of this country,” those agents were 
held by the court to have been acting under color of American, not 
foreign law.232 Therefore, the TVPA would not protect Arar.233 
Moreover, the court specifically rejected Arar’s argument that the 
CIA agents should be deemed as acting under foreign law because 
                                                           
any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or 
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or 
suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that 
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act 
that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. 
Id. 
228 In nations like Syria there is no adequate, alternative remedy for torture 
victims. Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 261 (citing, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 779 
(9th Cir. 1996); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887, at 
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); see also Cabello v. Fernandez Larios, 402 F.3d 
1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
231 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing 
Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991)). 
232 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 265. 
233 Id. at 266. 
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they conspired with foreign officials.234 In a similar case, the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Arar court’s reasoning and held that former national security 
advisor Henry Kissinger, who was allegedly involved in a coup in 
Chile that resulted in the defendant’s death, was acting pursuant to 
a Presidential directive, and therefore acting under auspices of U.S. 
law.235 These two rulings do not bode well for victims of 
extraordinary rendition. 
Like Bivens claims, suits under the TVPA are also easily 
defeated by the state secrets privilege,236 the separations of powers 
and political questions doctrines,237 or lack corroborative evidence 
                                                           
234 Id. Courts have held that sometimes, joint action between state and 
federal officials can be considered conduct under state law for purposes of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Arar argues that his case, where federal officials acted with 
foreign officials, is analogous and thus these US officials should be deemed as 
acting under foreign law. Id. at 265–66. In rejecting this argument, the court 
notes “it is perfectly reasonable to hold federal officials liable for constitutional 
wrongs committed under color of state law because federal officials, when acting 
under color of state law, are still acting under a legal regime established by our 
constitution and our common jurisprudence in the domestic arena.” Id. at 266. 
However, the issues federal officials face when acting in the foreign affairs realm 
“may involve conduct and relationships of an entirely different order and policy-
making on an entirely different plane . . . . U.S. officials deal with unique 
dangers not seen in domestic life and negotiate with foreign officials and 
individuals whose conduct is not controlled by the standards of our society.” Id. 
235 Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d. 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2004), 
aff’d 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding defendant was executing the direct 
orders of the President, which constitutes action pursuant to US law, even 
though defendant’s alleged foreign co-conspirators might have been acting 
pursuant to foreign law). 
236 In fact, the United States raised this defense in response to Maher Arar’s 
TVPA claim. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257–58, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006). However, the court sidestepped the state secrets privilege and dismissed 
Arar’s TVPA claim on other grounds. Id. at 266. Nonetheless, this defense 
could be raised against any future claim against the United States by an 
extraordinary rendition victim because the defense arises from the facts 
underlying extraordinary rendition, not any particular cause of action. See El-
Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535–39 (E.D. Va. 2006) (explaining how 
the defense can be raised based on the alleged conduct of the executive branch 
irrespective of a plaintiff’s particular cause of action). 
237 Any theory of liability an extraordinary rendition victim may have 
JOHNSTON FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/18/07 4:40 PM  
398 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
supporting the plaintiff’s claims.238 These continuing problems, 
coupled with courts’ refusal to view U.S. agents as acting under 
foreign law, make application of the TVPA virtually impossible for 
victims of extraordinary rendition. 
C.  ATS Claims 
Victims of extraordinary rendition may alternatively file suit 
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).239 Although the statute 
grants district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States,”240 the statute does not create any 
specific cause of action. Rather, the ATS merely grants federal 
courts jurisdiction over civil suits brought by aliens for violations 
of a limited set of well-recognized norms of international law.241 
Regardless of which international law a plaintiff bases his theory of 
liability upon, any action brought under the ATS will have four 
potentially fatal flaws. First, the brief language of the ATS makes 
clear that it applies only to aliens.242 Therefore, U.S. citizens have 
no remedy under this statute. Second, in defense of any ATS-based 
claim, the government will likely raise a state secrets defense.243 
                                                           
against the United States may be defeated by separation of powers and/or 
political question arguments because these doctrines arise from the alleged 
conduct of the executive branch in carrying out the extraordinary rendition 
program. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281–83 (explaining why courts should 
not intervene in matters better reserved for the other branches of government). 
238 Given the extreme secrecy surrounding the extraordinary rendition 
program and the fact that these victims do not have counsel while detained, it 
will likely be difficult for them to meet their preponderance of the evidence 
burden. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text. 
239 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
240 Id.; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699–700 (2004). 
241 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. The Supreme Court did not identify exactly 
which international legal norms are actionable under the ATS. Id. at 724–25. 
242 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only . . . .”). 
243 The government did just that in El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 
530, 541 (E.D. Va 2006), aff’d El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied El-Masri v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 373, 2007 WL 
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Futhermore, like cases involving Bivens and/or TVPA claims, any 
ATS-based claim may be defeated by the separation of powers 
and/or political question doctrines.244 Finally, like all other current 
causes of action, any plaintiff bringing an ATS claim would face 
tremendous evidentiary hurdles because the extraordinary rendition 
program is completely shrouded in secrecy.245 
III.  A SOLUTION: A SPECIFIC CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE 
UNITED STATES FOR VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
THAT EXPANDS THE SUPERVISION OF DETAINEES 
Although there are several causes of action available for victims 
of extraordinary rendition to bring suit against the United States, all 
of these options fail in practice. To truly provide checks and 
                                                           
1646914, *1 (2007). In El-Masri v. Tenet, the defendant, claiming to be a 
victim of extraordinary rendition, brought two ATS-based claims against the 
United States, and the government successfully moved to dismiss based on the 
state secrets privilege. Id. The gist of the government’s arguments in cases like 
El-Masri is that litigating these cases would result in the exposure of details 
about a clandestine intelligence program involving the United States and foreign 
governments that would harm national security. See id. at 537. The government 
could easily make this same argument in any future ATS-based suit brought by 
an alleged victim of extraordinary rendition because, by its very nature, the 
extraordinary rendition program involves state secrets. On a more general note, 
the Bush Administration has asserted this privilege nineteen times as of early 
June 2006, which is more frequent than any prior administration. Scott Shane, 
Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a More Popular Legal Tactic by U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4, 2006, at 32. This number is according to William G. Weaver, a 
political scientist at the University of Texas at El Paso. 
244 Maher Arar, a victim of extraordinary rendition who sued the United 
States, lost his TVPA and Bivens claims on precisely these grounds. See Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 281–83, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Although Arar 
did not raise an ATS-based claim, the same logic the Arar court used against 
TVPA and Bivens claims also works against ATS claims. This defense can be 
asserted against any fact pattern involving extraordinary rendition, regardless of 
plaintiff’s theory of liability, because this defense arises from the facts of the case, 
not the particular cause of action. See id. at 281–83 (noting that the defense 
arises from the executive branch’s alleged conduct, irrespective of plaintiff’s 
cause of action). 
245 See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text. 
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balances, and to ensure that victims are not left without a remedy, 
Congress must create a specific statutory cause of action against 
the United States for the victims. 
To be effective, such a cause of action must have eight 
objectives. First, it will help prevent due process and separation of 
powers violations by the Executive Branch. Second, it will allow 
courts to adjudicate claims of extraordinary rendition without 
running into political question and separation of powers problems. 
Third, existing causes of action do not provide redress to all human 
beings, and all people deserve protection against torture. Fourth, 
the liability of U.S. officials who participate in extraordinary 
rendition, directly or indirectly, needs to be clarified. Fifth, this 
cause of action must prevent the government from escaping 
liability by asserting the state secrets privilege. Sixth, the United 
States cannot be able to avoid liability by obtaining diplomatic 
assurances that the rendered individual will not be tortured because 
such assurances lack an acceptable degree of credibility or sincerity. 
Seventh, there needs to be an outside monitor of detainees that can 
either corroborate claims of abuse or exonerate innocent 
government officials because the secret nature of the extraordinary 
rendition programs makes the gathering of evidence very difficult. 
Finally, extraordinary rendition victims must be compensated to 
redress their injuries and deter similar conduct in the future. 
A.  Objectives of the Law 
1.  Preserving Due Process and Separation of Powers 
The greatest advantage of this proposal is that it will help 
protect due process rights of potential or actual victims of 
extraordinary rendition, while preserving the balance of power 
between the branches of the federal government. Due process 
ensures that the government operates within the bounds of the law 
and treats its constituents fairly and consistently.246 Thus, due 
                                                           
246 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (Observing that the 
Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary 
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process is an important check against tyranny because it prevents 
arbitrary treatment of people and helps prevent the punishment of 
innocent people. Like due process, ensuring the separation of 
powers is a similar critical check against tyranny.247 The separation 
of powers doctrine is “at the heart of our Constitution;” indeed, 
one of the dominant themes underlying the founding of the United 
States was the danger of governments digressing into tyranny and 
the need to structure government to prevent such digression.248 
2.  Addressing the Separation of Powers and Political Question 
Issues 
Another advantage of the above proposed law is that it will put 
to rest any separation of powers or political question doctrine 
problems that currently bar recovery for victims of extraordinary 
rendition.249 The Arar court pointed out the necessity of explicit 
Congressional action with regard to rendition lawsuits: “whether 
the policy [involves] undermin[ing] or overthrow[ing] foreign 
governments, or rendition, judges should not, in the absence of 
explicit direction by Congress, hold officials who carry out such 
policies liable for damages even if such conduct violates our treaty 
obligations or customary international law.”250 
                                                           
exercise of the powers of government.”); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual 
against arbitrary action of government.”). 
247 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per curiam); United States 
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) (Separation of powers was written into the 
Constitution as a “bulwark against tyranny.”). 
248 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 119–20 (explaining that James Madison in the 
Federalist No. 47 wrote of the importance of separation of powers as a check 
against tyranny). 
249 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279–84, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (dismissing Arar’s extraordinary rendition causes of action on political 
question and separation of powers grounds). 
250 Id. at 283 (emphasis added). 
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3.  Providing Redress For All Victims 
Unlike the Alien Tort Statute,251 any proposed legislative 
solution that provides a cause of action must be available to all 
human beings regardless of their citizenship or immigration status 
because the impropriety of extraordinary rendition is neither 
related to a person’s citizenship or immigration status nor should 
relief be so conditioned.252  There is no logical reason why non-
citizens should be excluded from bringing claims pursuant to the 
proposed statute. Critics may argue that persons captured outside 
of the United States should not have the same protections against 
torture as those captured on U.S. soil.253 However, Congress 
explicitly rejected arguments like this by enacting the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”): 
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any 
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds 
for believing the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is 
physically present in the United States.254 
 The language of the FARRA demonstrates that Congress 
intended to prohibit the extraordinary rendition of any person from 
any location. Therefore, not only would the universal application 
of the proposed law be consistent with Congressional intentions, 
but such a statute would also promote good public policy by 
                                                           
251 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
699-700 (2004). 
252 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 3 
(explaining that the fact that extraordinary rendition so far has only happened to 
non-American citizens is shocking because it reflects a kind of “legal apartheid” 
and an exaggerated sense of superiority). 
253 The Supreme Court has sometimes held that Constitutional protections 
do not apply to foreign nationals outside of the United States. For example, in 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to property in a foreign country owned by a nonresident alien 
that was searched and seized by U.S. agents. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
254 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, div. G, Title XXII, § 2242 (emphasis added). 
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extending a cause of action to all human beings. Extraordinarily 
rendering aliens captured abroad is as severe a violation of due 
process and other civil liberties as rendering Americans captured 
within the United States,255 and accordingly, both groups of people 
should have the same remedy. Moreover, extraordinary rendition is 
not despicable because of the victims’ citizenship or location, but 
rather because it offends human dignity and human rights that 
apply to all people by virtue of their humanity.256 
Finally, this law will allow all human beingseven convicted 
terroriststo sue the United States. While the idea of a terrorist 
suing the United States may be hard for some to stomach, due 
process protects convicted criminals,257 and this law gives effect to 
that protection. Moreover, the “any person” language258 in 
FARRA demonstrates Congressional intent that not even the worst 
of terrorists should be subject to extraordinary rendition. 
Additionally, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
extraordinary rendition is wrong because it is dehumanizing, and 
becoming a terrorist does not strip a person of his humanity.  
4.  Liability of U.S. Officials: Taking of Responsibility 
American case law supports the notion that liability attaches to 
U.S. officials who indirectly torture detainees or aid and abet the 
primary torturers by transferring a detainee to a nation known to 
torture prisoners.259 Further, organizations like Human Rights 
                                                           
255 Indeed, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment says no 
“person,” as opposed to no citizen, shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall any person. . .  
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”) (emphasis 
added). 
256 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 
(Rendition is a “degrading and dehumanizing practice” that inflicts “grave and 
long-lasting psychological damage” upon its victims.). 
257 United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1986). 
258 “[I]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or 
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person . . . .” Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, Title 
XXII, § 2242 (emphasis added). 
259 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
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Watch persuasively argue that “rendition to torture is the legal and 
moral equivalent of engaging in torture directly.”260 If the law only 
creates liability for those officials who directly torture detainees, it 
would not accomplish the policy goal of reducing torture and 
abuse, as U.S. officials could easily transfer the detainee to foreign 
officials who could torture the detainee. In fact, that is often how 
extraordinary rendition works.261 Therefore, as a practical matter, 
any law that does not include liability for those who aid or abet 
will have little effect in reducing torture or compensating the 
victims. 
5.  State Secrets Privilege: Balancing Secrets and Accountability 
Any solution to the problem of extraordinary rendition must 
also address the state secrets privilege.262 The government has an 
interest in keeping sensitive foreign affairs and intelligence gathering 
programs out of the public eye.263 At the same time, victims of 
extraordinary rendition have an interest in being compensated for 
their wrongful capture and torture and in deterring future 
                                                           
(citing, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 799 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at 
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); see also Cabello v. Fernandez Larios, 402 F.3d 
1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that every court considering the TVPA has 
concluded that it applies to indirect violators who aid and abet or conspire with 
the primary torturers). 
260 Wendy Patten, US Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch, 
Statement on U.S. Rendition Legislation (Mar. 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/10/usint10294.htm. 
261 Priest & Gellman, supra note 68 (explaining that U.S. officials often 
send detainees to other countries so the other nations can torture them). 
262 See supra notes 212 and 236 (explaining that in the two instances where 
a person has sued the United States for being subject to extraordinary rendition, 
the government has raised the state secrets defense). These cases show the 
government’s willingness to raise the privilege as a defense to extraordinary 
rendition suits. 
263 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(dismissing El-Masri’s extraordinary rendition lawsuit because the government 
has an interest in not revealing state secrets and litigating the matter would 
reveal those secrets). 
JOHNSTON FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/18/07 4:40 PM  
 LEAVING THE INVISIBLE UNIVERSE 405 
extraordinary renditions.264 The above proposed law will balance 
the competing interests of the parties by protecting sensitive 
information while providing for judicial oversight and 
compensation for victims. 
Allowing the government to escape liability by asserting the 
state secrets privilege effectively subverts the rule of law,265 which 
is especially problematic given that the consequence is torture. 
Moreover, as is clear from the government’s constant invocation of 
the state secrets doctrine,266 the Administration is overusing and 
abusing the privilege267 despite warnings from the Supreme Court 
that the privilege “is not to be lightly invoked.”268 
Regarding extraordinary rendition specifically, “[t]he experience 
of the [Arar Commission] suggests that governments may be 
                                                           
264 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va 2006) 
(recognizing that Khaled El-Masri has private interests in bringing his lawsuit); 
see generally Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l., Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1238 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen the state secrets privilege is validly asserted, the result is 
unfairness to individual litigants.”). 
265 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, 59 
(explaining that invoking state secrets years after the event in question occurred, 
like the US government did in the El-Masri litigation, “is unacceptable in a 
democratic state based on the rule of law” and that “state secrecy cannot in any 
circumstances justify or conceal criminal acts and serious human rights 
violations.”). 
266 Scott Shane, Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a More Popular Legal 
Tactic by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at 32. 
267 See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and 
Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 85–112 (Spring 2005). In reviewing 
many cases where the executive branch asserts the state secrets privilege, the 
authors state that “the state secrets privilege, a judicial creation, is now 
judicially mishandled to the detriment of our constitutional system.” Id. at 86. 
They also write that, “the privilege, as now employed, is tantamount to courts 
capitulating in their oversight function.” Id. at 90. The authors also discuss 
several cases in which the government invoked the privilege that resulted in 
injustice of a “sharp and disturbing nature,” such as Frost v. Perry, 919 F. 
Supp. 1459 (D. Nev. 1996) and Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 
1998). Id. at 103–04. Finally, the authors write that “conflict of interest is a 
fundamental problem afflicting the current arrangement for assertion of the 
privilege and the deference with which courts are required to treat such 
assertions.” Id. at 107. 
268 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). 
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tempted to make overbroad claims of secrecy to protect themselves 
from embarrassment and to hinder accountability processes. It also 
suggests, however, that much information about even 
contemporary national security activities can be made public 
without harming national security.”269 Generally speaking, the 
government has a tendency to overclassify information, especially 
when facing lawsuits by whistle-blowers or people with grievances 
against the government.270 For example, in a 2004 Congressional 
hearing, Carol Haave, the deputy undersecretary for 
counterintelligence at the time, admitted that “I do believe we 
overclassify information” and estimated that information is 
overclassified about half the time.271 Similarly, Thomas Kean, the 
chairman of the 9/11 committee, stated that in his opinion three 
quarters of the classified information he reviewed as chairman 
should not have been classified.272 
This trend in overclassification is not new, however. Erwin 
Griswold, the former U.S. Solicitor General who argued the 
Pentagon Papers Case,273 wrote an Op-Ed piece in The Washington 
Post stating there was not “any trace of a threat” to national 
security from the publication of the Pentagon Papers, despite the 
fact that the government classified the papers under national 
security concerns.274 Mr. Griswold continued: “It quickly becomes 
apparent to any person who has considerable experience with 
classified material that there is massive overclassification and that 
the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, 
                                                           
269 Rendition to Torture, supra note 158. For more on the Arar 
Commission, see supra note 158. 
270 See infra notes 271–78 and accompanying text. 
271 Too Many Secrets: Overclassification As a Barrier to Critical 
Information Sharing: Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats and International Relations, 108th Cong. 82 (2004) 
(statement of Carol Haave, deputy undersecretary for counterintelligence), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2004/082404transcript.html. 
272 Tom Blanton, Editorial, Eyes Only; The Lie Behind the Secrets, L.A. 
TIMES, May 21, 2006, at M1. 
273 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
274 Erwin Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and 
Classified Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25. 
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but with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another.”275 
Similarly, Tom Blanton, the director of the National Security 
Archive at George Washington University, recently argued in a Los 
Angeles Times editorial that the great irony about the state secrets 
privilege is that the case in which it was developed, Reynolds v. 
United States,276 was based on government dishonesty.277 
Specifically, he notes that the documents the government tried to 
keep secret in Reynolds did not contain actual state secrets; rather, 
the government classified them to cover up its own negligence.278 
The problem of overclassification, together with an imbalance 
between the rights of the government and the rights of the 
individual, has ensured that victims of extraordinary rendition do 
not have any effective remedies for their injuries. However, 
individual rights should not be subverted in the context of fighting 
terrorism.279 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,280 eight Justices of the 
Supreme Court held that a U.S. citizen, captured in a foreign 
combat zone and being detained as an enemy combatant, was 
entitled to, at a minimum, “a meaningful opportunity to contest the 
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker:”281 
[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President when 
it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. Whatever 
power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual 
liberties are at stake.282 
This individual right, not only of habeas corpus, but of the right to 
have the actions of the government reviewed in how it treats 
                                                           
275 Id. 
276 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
277 Blanton, supra note 272. 
278 Id.  
279 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’ Connor, J., 
plurality). 
280 542 U.S. 507. 
281 Id. at 509–10, 541, 573. 
282 Id. at 536 (O’ Connor, J., plurality) (internal citations omitted). 
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individuals, must be protected and strengthened, as the above law 
aims to do. 
Certainly, critics of the above proposal regarding the state 
secrets privilege may argue that the proposal will require the 
government to defend itself, even when claims are meritless, by 
disclosing sensitive information.283 This would effectively force an 
innocent party—the government—to pay for something that it did 
not do. As valid as this concern may be, however, the absence of 
such a requirement would permit a guilty governmental party to 
avoid liability for an entire set of offenses simply by asserting the 
privilege.284 Moreover, the proposed law provides a mechanism to 
deal with such concerns: the requirement that detainees be 
monitored by the ICRC will allow an innocent government to cite 
the testimony of Red Cross officials that the detainee was not 
tortured without having to reveal sensitive information. 285  
6.  Diplomatic Assurances 
Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has stated that is 
not U.S. policy to render detainees “to countries where we believe 
or we know that they’re going to be tortured” and that if a country 
has a history of torture, the United States will seek additional 
assurances that the rendered detainee will not be tortured.286 The 
United States claims that these assurances are not treated lightly.287 
The Washington Post reports that the CIA’s general counsel office 
requires that “the station chief in a given country [] obtain a verbal 
assurance from that country’s security service [that torture will not 
occur]. The assurance must be cabled back to CIA headquarters 
                                                           
283 See supra note 219 (explaining how an innocent government facing an 
extraordinary rendition lawsuit would have to disclose state secrets to defend 
itself). 
284 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 58 
(Khaled El-Masri is unable to hold anyone accountable for his extraordinary 
rendition because of the state secrets privilege.). 
285 For more on this requirement, see infra Part III.B.7. 
286 Smith, supra note 79. 
287 Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send 
Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1. 
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before a rendition takes place.”288 An anonymous U.S. official has 
stated that “we get assurances, we check on those assurances, and 
we double-check on these assurances to make sure that people are 
being handled properly in respect to human rights,” and that 
compliance is ‘‘very high.’’289 Nonetheless, ‘‘nothing is 100 
percent unless we’re sitting there staring at [the rendered detainees] 
24 hours a day.’’290 
This process, therefore, only illustrates that government 
officials should not be allowed to defend themselves with 
diplomatic assurances that the detainee will not be tortured in the 
host nation because “the odds of torture after a rendition are much 
higher than fifty percent and diplomatic assurances [in this context] 
are legally worthless.”291 Even U.S. intelligence agents involved in 
renditions claim that the CIA recognizes the flimsy nature of 
diplomatic assurances.292 Vincent Cannistraro, the former head of 
the CIA’s counterterrorism division, has stated in regards to Maher 
Arar’s case that “you would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to 
believe that the Syrians were not going to use torture, even if they 
                                                           
288 Dana Priest, CIA’s Assurances On Transferred Suspects Doubted; 
Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture Pledges, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 
2005, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, CIA Assurances Doubted]. 
289 Jehl & Johnston, supra note 287. 
290 Id. 
291 Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic 
Assurances and the Legality of “Rendition,” 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 213, 263–
64 (2006). Ms. Hawkins examined twenty cases of rendition, seventeen of which 
involved allegations of torture. If the prisoners in the other three cases were 
tortured, they have no way of making their allegations known because they have 
not been released or heard from after being rendered. In two of the seventeen 
cases, the allegations of torture were vague and from a source of suspect 
credibility, but the detainees were in Egypt, a nation with a long history of 
torture. In two other cases, the torture allegations are vague, but they come from 
U.S. officials who “have no reason to fabricate them.” In the remaining thirteen 
cases, the torture allegations were detailed, corroborated by other evidence, and 
consistent with reports from other detainees and human rights groups describing 
the process. Ms. Hawkins’ argument is that diplomatic assurances are worthless 
because in at least seventeen of these twenty cases, there is reason to believe the 
detainee was tortured anyway. Id.  
292 Id. at 261. 
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were making claims to the contrary.”293 Arar’s case is probably the 
best documented example of the failure of diplomatic assurances to 
prevent torture. Current and former intelligence officers and 
lawyers have told the media that this system of relying on 
diplomatic assurances is “ineffective” and “virtually impossible to 
monitor.”294 Another U.S. official who has visited foreign detention 
sites stated that the issue “goes far beyond” the assurance: “They 
say they are not abusing them, and that satisfies the legal 
requirement, but we all know they do.”295 The picture that emerges 
from these media accounts is that diplomatic assurances are made 
and accepted in bad faith and do not serve to prevent or reduce 
torture of extraordinary rendition victims. 
7.  ICRC Monitoring of Detainees 
Ensuring that the ICRC monitors all detainees will be 
advantageous to all sides. Detainees will benefit because the ICRC 
will monitor their condition and get them any necessary help. 
Moreover, if the detainee’s allegations regarding extraordinary 
rendition are true, the ICRC may provide corroborating evidence in 
court. The government will also benefit from the presence of the 
ICRC because if the plaintiffs allegations are false, then ICRC 
evidence will bolster its defense. 
If, however, the ICRC is not allowed to monitor all detainees, 
the detainee’s allegations will be presumed true in order to prevent 
abuse and bad faith actions. This is necessary because otherwise, 
the ICRC will not be able to corroborate the detainee’s story, nor 
rebut the story with other evidence and act as a defense for the 
government. This aspect of the proposal will ensure that both sides 
are balanced and dependent on the presence of the ICRC for 
evidentiary purposes. For example, if the United States sends a 
detainee to a nation that it knows will not admit the ICRC, it is 
creating an inherently unfair situation for the detainee, because the 
                                                           
293 Shannon McCaffrey, Canadian Sent to Syrian Prison Disputes U.S. 
Claims Against Torture, KNIGHT-RIDDER, Aug. 1, 2004. 
294 Priest, CIA Assurances Doubted, supra note 288. 
295 Id. 
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very circumstances of his detention make it difficult to prove his 
allegations in court. Moreover, the Executive Branch is in the best 
position to ensure that the ICRC has access to detainees,296 and if 
it cannot do so, it must shoulder the burden. 
8.  Making Things Right: Awarding Plaintiffs Damages 
Victims of extraordinary rendition are tortured both mentally 
and physically.297 On the most basic level, the uncertainty arising 
from being detained secretly, without anyone other than the 
detainee’s captors knowing about his whereabouts or well-being, 
and without any judicial or ICRC control, is a form of torture.298 
Extraordinary rendition is a degrading and dehumanizing process 
that inflicts “grave and long-lasting” psychological damage on its 
victims.299 What’s worse, these “deep psychological scars” persist 
long after the detainee is located or released.300 Victims have a 
“permanent fear of death,” are unable to have normal relationships, 
and suffer from flashbacks and panic attacks.301 Additionally, “on a 
daily basis, stigma and suspicion seem to haunt anybody branded 
as ‘suspect’ in the ‘war on terror,’” making links with normal 
society “practically impossible to restore.”302 It is undeniable, 
therefore, that all plaintiffs should be able to recover damages for 
extraordinary rendition. 
To begin, victims should be able to receive punitive damages if 
they demonstrate a valid case of extraordinary rendition. At a basic 
level, courts award punitive damages to punish defendants for 
malicious or willful conduct and to deter others from similar 
                                                           
296 The executive is in the best position because it is the detainer. 
297 Infra notes 298–302 and accompanying text. 
298 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25, and 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 51 (Louise Arbour, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has said that 
detention without judicial or ICRC review in an unknown location is a form of 
torture.). 
299 COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. 
300 Id. at 23. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
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conduct.303 Sometimes, decent law-abiding people are careless and 
injure another; society however reacts more strongly to the 
deliberate wrongdoer, and punitive damages are one way of 
expressing the high level of condemnation of certain morally 
reprehensible acts.304 Torturing a person, or rendering him to a 
nation when the renderer has substantial grounds to believe the 
victim will be tortured, is certainly malicious, willful conduct that 
must be deterred. Furthermore, punitive damages are “especially 
appropriate” when the government violates individuals’ 
Constitutional rights.305 
Moreover, compensatory damages do not always compensate 
the plaintiff fully, especially when the injury is real but difficult to 
quantify.306 Understandably, torture and deprivation of liberty are 
very difficult to quantify, so there is the risk that compensatory 
damages will be inadequate. Since torture does more harm than 
good to society,307 punitive damages will ensure that extraordinary 
rendition victims are adequately compensated without risking the 
suppression of a socially valuable activity.308 If compensatory 
damages cannot compensate for the actual harm done, and if 
punitive damages are not awarded, then the behavior will not be 
deterred.309 Punitive damages will “assure full compensation 
without impeding socially valuable conduct,” even if they provide 
what some may consider excessive damage awards, because the 
                                                           
303 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986). 
304 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996). 
305 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 22. As this Note argues, extraordinary 
rendition violates a number of Constitutional provisions, most notably the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
306 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 34. 
307 That torture does more harm than good to society is implicit in the 
various international treaties and agreements banning torture, such as the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture (Dec 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-
20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85), federal laws banning torture, such as the Torture Act of 
2000 (18 U.S.C. §§2340 and 2340A), and policy statements such as FARRA 
(see supra note 254 and accompanying text). 
308 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 34. 
309 Id. 
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deterrent value will be so high.310 
Additionally, punitive damages are necessary when the 
tortuous conduct is concealable, because a judgment equal to the 
value of the harm done will under-deter, as not all actions will be 
discovered.311 It is difficult to conceive of a tort more concealable 
than extraordinary rendition: the government will not even 
officially admit to the practice312 and victims of extraordinary 
rendition are said to enter an “invisible universe.”313 Indeed, in both 
instances where an alleged victim of extraordinary rendition has 
sued the United States, the government has tried to conceal aspects 
of the case by invoking the state secrets privilege.314 
                                                           
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 34–35.  
Suppose a person who goes around assaulting other people is caught 
only half the time. Then in comparing the costs, in the form of 
anticipated damages, of the assaults with the benefits to him, he will 
discount the costs (but not the benefits, because they are realized in 
every assault) by 50 percent, and so in deciding whether to commit the 
next assault he will not be confronted by the full social cost of his 
activity. 
Id. at 35. 
However, if punitive damages are imposed:  
[k]nowing that he will have to pay compensation for harm inflicted, the 
potential injurer will be deterred from inflicting that harm unless the 
benefits to him are greater. If we do not want him to balance costs and 
benefits in this fashion, we can add a dollop of punitive damages to 
make the costs greater.  
Id. at 34. 
312 President Bush has admitted that “a small number of suspected terrorist 
leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned 
outside the United States” in a program operated by the CIA that employs “an 
alternative set of procedures” that are tough. Remarks on the War on Terror, 
supra note 88, at 1570-71. However, President Bush denies that the procedures 
employed in this program are illegal and that maintains that “the United States 
does not torture.” Id. at 1571, 1573. 
313 Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects, supra note 66. 
314 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007); Arar 
v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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B.  Specific Elements of this Cause of Action 
The specific elements of this proposed cause of action may be 
grouped according to the definition of extraordinary rendition and 
limits on who can be a potential plaintiff or defendant; the 
procedural element of the permissible claim; the checks and 
balances required; and the damages that may be awarded. First, 
extraordinary rendition will be defined the same way it is in this 
Note: “the transfer of an individual, with the involvement of the 
United States or its agents, to a foreign state when there are 
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture.”315 Second, the remedy will extend to 
any human being, regardless of his citizenship status or the location 
where he was allegedly seized and/or tortured. A third element will 
be that the plaintiffs will be allowed to sue any individuals who 
were either directly or indirectly liable for the extraordinary 
rendition and torture, including those who aid and abet or conspire 
with the primary actors 
As for the procedural element, fourth, this cause of action 
should provide that if the government raises a state secrets defense 
to any or all the elements, then the court will automatically grant 
judgment for the plaintiff(s) on those element(s) but will not force 
the government to reveal the secrets. 
In regard to the checks and balances in place, a fifth requirement 
will be a mandate that the United States must allow members of the 
ICRC to visit and monitor every detainee without exception.316 
This provision will require the Executive Branch to enforce its 
provisions as best as possible and will explicitly state that if a 
prisoner can show that he or she was not monitored by the ICRC 
(such as through testimony of ICRC personnel), everything the 
victim alleges that could have been corroborated by the ICRC will 
be presumed true. 
Additional checks and balances will also require that the 
                                                           
315 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
316 This section will apply to any human being, in any location, who is in 
the custody of U.S. agents, except for prisoners in federal custody who are in 
some stage of the regular criminal justice system. 
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plaintiff(s) must show that the defendants had or should have had 
substantial grounds to believe that the “host” nation would torture 
the plaintiff.317 A reliance on diplomatic assurances from foreign 
officials by U.S. officials that the “host” nation will not torture will 
be explicitly rejected as a defense, requiring more active 
responsibility on the part of the United States in monitoring the 
host nation.  
Finally, the seventh requirement relates to compensation, and 
will provide damages to eligible plaintiffs for pain and suffering, 
loss of liberty, emotional distress, damage to reputation, as well as 
punitive damages. As a practical matter, these seven requirements 
are essential to this cause of action, and they will advance the goals 
listed above. 
CONCLUSION 
Extraordinary rendition violates the due process rights of its 
victims and is a blatant example of unchecked executive power. 
This Note calls on Congress to create a cause of action for victims 
of extraordinary rendition that solves both of these problems. In 
doing so, this Note proposes a number of legal changes concerning 
who may be protected, how evidence will be ensured, and the 
damages that plaintiffs will be able to collect, in an effort to help 
resolve such a sensitive and controversial practice. The proposed 
law will balance both governmental and individual interests, but 
provide victims with a presumption of torture if other factors are 
present, prodding the Executive Branch into complying with the 
law. Similarly, the proposed law will mandate independent 
monitoring of detainees, producing evidence from a neutral source 
that may be used by either side at trial. In the end, we must not 
forget that an important purpose of government is to protect 
individuals from all threats, including those threats from the 
government itself. The best way to fulfill this purpose is to have all 
                                                           
317 Plaintiffs could make this showing with reports by the State Department 
or another agency of the U.S. government, United Nations reports, reports by 
foreign governments, media reports, reports of human rights organizations, 
decisions by international or domestic courts, academic articles, or other 
evidence. 
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three branches of the government work together to ensure the 
security of the United States and the rights of all people. 
 
